

Online Appendix


Smoke with Fire: Financial Crises and the Demand for Parliamentary Oversight in the European Union

The following tables and figures represent the supplementary material based, respectively, on:

- The historical (1950's-2010) country-year data, and
- The Euro crisis (2007-2014) country-month data.


Country-Year Data

Figure A.1: States' Distances on Economic Integration and Competence Delegation to the EU



Multidimensional scaling configuration of member states' aggregate ideal positions on two issues coded in the Euromanifesto data collection project. For the years up to 2008, we rely on Veen (2011)'s additive EU policy scales. The EMU dimension is based on two categories: Positive or negative mentions of the ECB (Manifesto Project categories 4087; 4086) as well as the assessments of EMU and the Euro (3151; 3141). The delegation dimension instead comprises attitudes on three topics: European Community/Union (110; 108); Transfer of Power to the EC/EC (3011; 3021); and Competencies of the European Parliament (307; 306). Positions are constructed by summing frequencies of quasi-sentences from European Parliament manifestos. They are scaled on each policy and computed with a logarithmic function. The policy scores range from -50 to 50, where 0 denotes ambiguity over an issue. For 2014, we use the equivalent dimensions using the Schmitt et al. (2016) data. In 2008 Bulgaria and Romania are omitted because they are missing. In red the countries that since the 1990s (or upon EU admission) belong to the EMU.


Figure A.2: Banking crises, debt and oversight index: entire sample




The graph shows the relevant variables of the first empirical part of the paper in original form for all the countries in our dataset.

Figure A.3: Banking crises, debt and change of oversight across EMU and non-EMU countries: selected countries

Non EMU countries



EMU countries



The graph shows change (differenced) EU oversight, banking crises and debt for a selected number of EMU and non-EMU countries.

Table A.1: Crises and the Independence of Central Banks

	<i>Y: Central Bank Independence δ</i>			
	<i>Monetarily independent states, 1950s-2010</i>		<i>EMU states, 1995-2010</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Central Bank Independence $_{t-1}$	-0.016* (0.0088)	-0.015* (0.0086)	-0.28*** (0.022)	-0.28*** (0.021)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$	7.84** (3.49)	6.92 (6.64)	0.14 (0.91)	-0.92 (2.56)
Banking crisis δ	2.49 (2.47)	-0.092 (2.05)	0.087 (0.47)	0.080 (0.27)
Debt $_{t-1}$	0.009 (0.008)	0.005 (0.010)	-0.011 (0.006)	-0.011* (0.006)
Debt δ	-0.074 (0.048)	-0.051 (0.037)	0.003 (0.049)	0.008 (0.058)
Government ideology $_{t-1}$	-0.027 (0.29)	-0.000 (0.26)	0.49 (0.42)	0.000 (0.00)
Government ideology δ	0.24* (0.14)	0.21 (0.14)	0.039 (0.19)	-0.036 (0.17)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		-0.031 (0.11)		0.013 (0.020)
Banking crisis δ \times Debt to GDP δ		0.44*** (0.13)		-0.005 (0.035)
Constant	0.41 (0.77)	0.67 (0.84)	24.7*** (2.04)	25.1*** (1.91)
N	624	624	178	178
Countries	25	25	15	15
R^2	0.046	0.084	0.23	0.23

The table reports linear ECM estimation coefficients of the outcome *Central Bank Independence δ* (for details on the variable, see the main document). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.2: Crises and the Independence of Central Banks Controlling for Inflation

	<i>Y: Central Bank Independence δ</i>			
	<i>Monetarily independent states, 1950s-2010</i>		<i>EMU states, 1995-2010</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Central Bank Independence $_{t-1}$	-0.051 ^{***} (0.019)	-0.057 ^{***} (0.021)	-0.29 ^{***} (0.025)	-0.28 ^{***} (0.024)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$	5.28 (3.98)	7.65 (6.98)	-0.42 (0.97)	-0.82 (2.86)
Banking crisis δ	1.25 (3.41)	-0.87 (3.07)	-0.19 (0.62)	0.000 (0.34)
Debt $_{t-1}$	0.014 (0.013)	0.008 (0.014)	-0.010 (0.007)	-0.009 (0.006)
Debt δ	-0.033 (0.041)	-0.038 (0.039)	0.002 (0.071)	0.007 (0.066)
Government ideology $_{t-1}$	0.18 (0.23)	0.15 (0.23)	0.026 (0.21)	-0.083 (0.19)
Government ideology δ	-0.013 (0.41)	-0.021 (0.41)	0.49 (0.52)	
Inflation $_{t-1}$	0.30 ^{***} (0.097)	0.24 ^{***} (0.078)	0.012 (0.014)	
Inflation δ	0.027 ^{**} (0.011)	0.033 ^{***} (0.012)	0.020 (0.027)	0.007 (0.023)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		-0.077 (0.092)		0.009 (0.023)
Banking crisis δ \times Debt to GDP δ		0.40 ^{***} (0.15)		-0.008 (0.035)
Constant	-0.78 (1.67)	-0.34 (1.72)	23.0 ^{***} (2.63)	24.2 ^{***} (2.18)
N	371	371	156	169
Countries	25	25	13	13
R^2	0.13	0.16	0.23	0.23

The table reports linear ECM estimation coefficients of the outcome *Central Bank Independence δ* , with additionally the *Inflation* variable. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.3: Crises and Parliamentary Oversight of the EU: Sovereign Countries' Subsamples

	<i>Y: Oversight Institutions δ</i>			
	Eastern Enlargement candidates 1950s-2003		Monetarily independent states 1995-2010	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Oversight Institutions $_{t-1}$	-0.18*** (0.045)	-0.19*** (0.049)	-0.16** (0.045)	-0.17*** (0.043)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$	-3.51 (5.68)	-7.64 (5.90)	-4.63 (3.39)	-6.06 (4.40)
Banking crisis δ	-3.78 (4.84)	-2.70* (1.55)	-0.19 (2.07)	-0.43 (1.28)
Debt to GDP δ	0.027 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.25)	-0.015 (0.15)	-0.024 (0.15)
Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$	-0.068* (0.037)	-0.092** (0.046)	-0.029 (0.029)	-0.040 (0.032)
Government ideology $_{t-1}$	0.16 (1.33)	0.19 (1.42)	0.16 (0.63)	0.22 (0.67)
Government ideology δ	-0.32 (0.86)	-0.24 (0.88)	-0.34 (0.76)	-0.28 (0.79)
Inflation $_{t-1}$	0.15*** (0.052)	0.16** (0.066)	0.12** (0.059)	0.13** (0.065)
Inflation δ	0.29** (0.13)	0.17 (0.24)	0.079 (0.089)	-0.023 (0.092)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		-0.14 (0.23)		0.056 (0.083)
Banking crisis δ \times Debt to GDP δ		0.54 (0.39)		0.14 (0.16)
Constant	0.043 (5.36)	0.44 (5.96)	2.45 (4.33)	2.13 (5.52)
N	112	112	143	143
Countries	10	10	14	14
R^2	0.10	0.14	0.11	0.12

The table reports linear ECM estimation coefficients of the outcome *Oversight Institutions* δ . Subsamples are specified at the top of the table. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.4: Financial Crises and Change in Oversight Institutions: Control for EU Treaties

	<i>Y: Oversight Institutions δ</i>			
	<i>Monetarily independent states, 1950s-2010</i>		<i>EMU states, 1995-2010</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Oversight Institutions $_{t-1}$	-0.13*** (0.035)	-0.13*** (0.035)	-0.032** (0.016)	-0.025 (0.017)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$	-7.92** (3.44)	-10.5*** (3.47)	2.41 (4.04)	16.9 (10.8)
Banking crisis δ	-3.71** (1.55)	-3.08** (1.33)	-1.88 [†] (1.04)	-3.79 [†] (2.00)
Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$	0.0002 (0.012)	-0.003 (0.012)	0.002 (0.015)	0.006 (0.012)
Debt to GDP δ	0.070 (0.077)	0.081 (0.082)	0.006 (0.069)	-0.086 (0.10)
Government ideology $_{t-1}$	-0.37 (0.30)	-0.39 (0.30)	-0.13 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.18)
Government ideology δ	-0.36 (0.51)	-0.32 (0.53)	0.17 (0.25)	0.21 (0.27)
Inflation $_{t-1}$	0.052*** (0.017)	0.050*** (0.018)	0.008 (0.032)	0.010 (0.030)
Inflation δ	0.0034 (0.094)	-0.075 (0.11)	0.14 (0.087)	0.13** (0.061)
SEA $_{t-1}$	0.32 (0.90)	0.39 (0.93)		
SEA δ	1.57 (1.89)	1.56 (1.90)		
Maastricht $_{t-1}$	3.94** (1.90)	4.21** (1.98)		
Maastricht δ	1.21 (3.02)	1.18 (3.00)		
Amsterdam $_{t-1}$	-3.43 (2.13)	-3.56 (2.19)	-0.042 (0.43)	0.008 (0.45)
Amsterdam δ	-0.72 (3.35)	-0.80 (3.37)	0.12 (0.60)	0.009 (0.61)
Nice $_{t-1}$	5.80** (2.68)	5.80** (2.67)	0.33 (0.49)	0.39 (0.47)
Nice δ	-1.71** (0.77)	-1.78** (0.75)	1.37 (1.82)	1.47 (1.87)
Lisbon $_{t-1}$	-4.25 [†] (2.23)	-5.37** (2.44)	2.09 (1.72)	1.98 (1.46)
Lisbon δ	-2.57 (1.99)	-2.71 (1.70)	0.41 (0.77)	1.28 (1.18)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		0.097 [†] (0.052)		-0.19 [†] (0.11)
Banking crisis δ \times Debt to GDP δ		-0.043 (0.063)		0.25 (0.16)
Constant	4.49** (1.84)	5.09*** (1.85)	1.66 (4.12)	0.70 (3.58)
N (Countries)	299 (23)	299 (23)	156 (13)	156 (13)
R ²	0.15	0.16	0.13	0.18

The table reports linear ECM estimation coefficients of the outcome *Oversight Institutions δ* . Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.5: Financial Crises and Change in Oversight Institutions: Control for Political System

	<i>Y: Oversight Institutions δ</i>			
	<i>Monetarily independent states, 1950s-2010</i>		<i>EMU states, 1995-2010</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Oversight Institutions $_{t-1}$	-0.13*** (0.029)	-0.13*** (0.029)	-0.035* (0.018)	-0.024 (0.021)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$	-7.44*** (2.45)	-8.63*** (2.35)	4.38 (5.46)	19.0 (12.0)
Banking crisis δ	-2.45** (1.20)	-3.02*** (1.13)	-1.23 (0.99)	-2.75 (1.71)
Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.011 (0.012)	0.001 (0.016)	0.006 (0.014)
Debt to GDP δ	0.048 (0.086)	0.053 (0.087)	0.030 (0.063)	-0.067 (0.095)
Government ideology $_{t-1}$	-0.26 (0.30)	-0.26 (0.30)	-0.12 (0.19)	-0.16 (0.18)
Government ideology δ	-0.19 (0.43)	-0.17 (0.44)	0.096 (0.24)	0.087 (0.26)
Inflation $_{t-1}$	0.10*** (0.022)	0.11*** (0.022)	0.024 (0.033)	0.037 (0.033)
Inflation δ	0.12 (0.079)	0.061 (0.098)	0.13* (0.075)	0.12** (0.057)
Full Presidential System $_{t-1}$	-4.49*** (1.24)	-4.58*** (1.22)	-1.49** (0.67)	-1.47** (0.71)
Semi-Presidential Systems $_{t-1}$	-0.28 (1.12)	-0.26 (1.13)	-0.087 (0.37)	0.29 (0.51)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		0.028 (0.033)		-0.19* (0.11)
Banking crisis δ \times Debt to GDP δ		0.089** (0.043)		0.25 (0.16)
Constant	2.08 (1.69)	2.36 (1.72)	0.79 (4.40)	-1.79 (4.50)
N (Countries)	299 (23)	299 (23)	156 (13)	156 (13)
R^2	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.17

The table reports linear ECM estimation coefficients of the outcome *Oversight Institutions δ* . *Full Presidential System* refers to Cyprus, while *Semi-Presidential Systems* refer to France, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal and Romania. These variables are lagged only, because no major system change was observed in the timeline of the paper. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.6: Financial Crises and Change in Oversight Institutions: Control for Public and Parties' Euroskepticism

	<i>Y: Oversight Institutions δ</i>			
	<i>EMU states, 1995-2010</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Oversight Institutions $_{t-1}$	-0.049 (0.054)	-0.028 (0.032)	-0.026 (0.036)	-0.0051 (0.025)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$	10.00 (7.45)	17.5** (8.71)	11.1 (8.45)	16.0* (8.62)
Banking crisis δ	2.37 (3.44)	-13.1*** (4.40)	2.84 (4.03)	-14.6*** (5.09)
Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$	-0.036** (0.015)	-0.022 (0.015)	-0.039* (0.021)	-0.022 (0.021)
Debt to GDP δ	-0.12 (0.21)	0.050 (0.093)	-0.15 (0.21)	0.096 (0.14)
Inflation $_{t-1}$	0.099 (0.11)	0.077** (0.037)	0.069 (0.11)	0.077 (0.048)
Inflation δ	0.28 (0.19)	0.28*** (0.091)	0.27 (0.19)	0.37*** (0.13)
Government ideology $_{t-1}$	-0.20 (0.33)	-0.071 (0.37)	-0.18 (0.35)	-0.032 (0.48)
Government ideology δ	-0.42 (0.51)	-0.17 (0.44)	-0.49 (0.45)	-0.12 (0.37)
Public Euroskepticism	7.61 (10.5)	-1.43 (9.31)		
Party system EU division			0.42 (0.79)	-0.40 (0.67)
Party system EU position			-0.22 (5.69)	-5.28 (5.23)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		-0.23** (0.092)		-0.23** (0.100)
Banking crisis δ \times Debt to GDP δ		0.86*** (0.23)		0.94*** (0.23)
Constant	-3.96 (12.1)	-3.80 (3.92)	-1.57 (31.5)	22.3 (26.7)
<i>Multiplier</i>				
<i>Banking crisis \times Debt to GDP</i>		-0.647 (0.531)		-0.668 (0.387)
<i>N (Countries)</i>	31 (11)	31 (11)	33 (11)	33 (11)
	0.48	0.77	0.48	0.80

The table reports linear ECM estimation coefficients of the outcome *Oversight Institutions δ* . *Public Euroskepticism* refers to a continuous variable based on the ESS; *Party system EU division* refers to a variable that captures the parties' division on the issue of European integration (CHES data); *Party system EU position* is the aggregate mean of a party system's position on the EU according to the Comparative Manifesto Project. The data refers to data only between 1898 and 2010 (the data span of Spoon and Williams 2017). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.7: Crises and Parliamentary Oversight of the EU: Fixed Effects Models

	<i>Oversight Institutions δ</i>			
	<i>Monetarily independent states, 1950-2010</i>		<i>EMU states, 1995-2010</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Banking crisis _{$t-1$}	-25.5*** (8.10)	-21.7** (9.27)	3.19 (3.63)	17.2* (10.3)
Banking crisis δ	-10.7** (4.44)	-12.0*** (4.45)	-1.70* (1.02)	-3.61 (2.26)
Debt to GDP _{$t-1$}	0.39*** (0.057)	0.37*** (0.059)	0.030 (0.035)	0.024 (0.035)
Debt to GDP δ	0.17 (0.11)	0.11 (0.11)	0.002 (0.067)	-0.12 (0.11)
Government ideology _{$t-1$}	-0.23 (0.59)	-0.20 (0.59)	0.11 (0.22)	-0.0062 (0.19)
Government ideology δ	0.075 (0.63)	0.024 (0.62)	0.19 (0.30)	0.16 (0.30)
Inflation _{$t-1$}	0.13** (0.061)	0.16** (0.067)	0.088 (0.072)	0.091 (0.068)
Inflation δ	0.11 (0.15)	0.056 (0.23)	0.18* (0.094)	0.16** (0.067)
Banking crisis _{$t-1$} \times Debt to GDP _{$t-1$}		-0.093 (0.13)		-0.19* (0.11)
Banking crisis δ \times Debt to GDP δ		0.35* (0.20)		0.26 (0.19)
Constant	-8.08 (5.27)	-8.91* (5.29)	-10.8 (8.68)	-10.5 (8.28)
Country and Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N	311	311	156	156
Countries	23	23	13	13
R^2	0.86	0.86	0.20	0.24

The table reports linear fixed effect estimation coefficients of the outcome *Oversight Institutions*. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.8: Crises and Parliamentary Oversight of the EU: Population-Averaged Models

	<i>Oversight Institutions δ</i>			
	<i>Monetarily independent states, 1950-2010</i>		<i>EMU states, 1995-2010</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Oversight Institutions $_{t-1}$	-0.12*** (0.026)	-0.12*** (0.027)	-0.030** (0.015)	-0.022 (0.016)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$	-7.24*** (2.32)	-8.25*** (2.25)	4.59 (5.28)	18.5* (11.2)
Banking crisis δ	-2.43** (1.12)	-2.96*** (1.03)	-1.14 (0.95)	-2.73* (1.65)
Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$	-0.009 (0.012)	-0.012 (0.012)	0.001 (0.015)	0.005 (0.013)
Debt to GDP δ	0.049 (0.082)	0.054 (0.082)	0.031 (0.057)	-0.056 (0.082)
Government ideology $_{t-1}$	-0.19 (0.28)	-0.19 (0.29)	-0.14 (0.20)	-0.16 (0.19)
Government ideology δ	-0.15 (0.43)	-0.13 (0.43)	0.084 (0.24)	0.096 (0.26)
Inflation $_{t-1}$	0.096*** (0.021)	0.098*** (0.020)	0.020 (0.031)	0.032 (0.030)
Inflation δ	0.12 (0.076)	0.072 (0.094)	0.13* (0.073)	0.12** (0.056)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		0.023 (0.030)		-0.18* (0.10)
Banking crisis δ \times Debt to GDP δ		0.081** (0.039)		0.24 (0.15)
Constant	1.64 (1.54)	1.89 (1.59)	0.76 (4.11)	-1.30 (3.80)
N (Countries)	299 (23)	299 (23)	156 (13)	156 (13)
Wald χ	41.25	147.31	27.94	39.92

The table reports linear population-averaged panel-data models estimation coefficients of the outcome *Oversight Institutions δ* . Within-group correlation is independent. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.

Table A.9: Financial Crises and Change in Oversight Institutions: Alternative Index

	<i>Y: Oversight Institutions δ</i>			
	<i>Monetarily independent states, 1950-2010</i>		<i>EMU states, 1995-2010</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Oversight Institutions $_{t-1}$	-0.12*** (0.029)	-0.13*** (0.029)	-0.031* (0.018)	-0.029* (0.018)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$	-7.77*** (2.30)	-8.63*** (2.28)	1.43 (2.56)	7.61 (4.76)
Banking crisis δ	-2.64** (1.14)	-3.25*** (1.06)	-0.85 (0.66)	-1.46* (0.85)
Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$	-0.0041 (0.014)	-0.006 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.013)	-0.001 (0.013)
Debt to GDP δ	0.053 (0.086)	0.058 (0.086)	0.016 (0.035)	-0.020 (0.040)
Government ideology $_{t-1}$	-0.18 (0.31)	-0.18 (0.31)	-0.099 (0.17)	-0.11 (0.17)
Government ideology δ	-0.13 (0.45)	-0.12 (0.46)	0.15 (0.24)	0.16 (0.25)
Inflation $_{t-1}$	0.11*** (0.023)	0.11*** (0.022)	0.016 (0.027)	0.022 (0.028)
Inflation δ	0.13* (0.076)	0.080 (0.099)	0.069** (0.031)	0.063*** (0.024)
Banking crisis $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		0.017 (0.034)		-0.080* (0.044)
Banking crisis δ \times Debt to GDP δ		0.089** (0.042)		0.096 (0.066)
Constant	1.19 (1.69)	1.41 (1.73)	1.44 (4.01)	0.62 (3.84)
N	299	299	156	156
Countries	23	23	13	13
R^2	0.12	0.13	0.073	0.081

The table reports linear ECM estimation coefficients of the outcome *Oversight Institutions δ* (alternative index). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Country-Month Data

Table A.10: National Parliamentary Debates: List of the Texts Selected from the Official Parliamentary Minutes of Web Archives in Germany, France and Italy.

Country	Month-Year	National Debate in the Dataset (No. or Code of Debate or Date)
Germany	Oct-07	16110, 16111, 16113
	Nov-07	
	Dec-07	16133
	Jan-08	
	Feb-08	16142, 16143
	Mar-08	
	Apr-08	16158
	May-08	
	Jun-08	
	Jul-08	
	Aug-08	
	Sep-08	16174, 16179
	Oct-08	16181, 16182, 16184
	Nov-08	16185, 16186, 16188, 16189, 16191
	Dec-08	16193, 16194, 16196
	Jan-09	16198, 16200, 16203
	Feb-09	16206
	Mar-09	16211
	Apr-09	16217
	May-09	16223
	Jun-09	16227
	Jul-09	16229, 16230
	Aug-09	16232
	Sep-09	16233
	Oct-09	
	Nov-09	17003
	Dec-09	17010, 17012
	Jan-10	17014, 17015, 17019, 17020
	Feb-10	17022, 17024
	Mar-10	17027, 17029, 17030, 17034
	Apr-10	17036, 17037
	May-10	17039, 17040, 17041, 17042, 17043, 17044
	Jun-10	17046, 17047, 17049, 17050
	Jul-10	17051, 17052, 17055
	Aug-10	
	Sep-10	17057, 17058, 17060
	Oct-10	17063, 17065, 17067
	Nov-10	17074, 17075, 17076
	Dec-10	17077, 17078, 17080
	Jan-11	17084
	Feb-11	
	Mar-11	17096, 17099
	Apr-11	17104
	May-11	17108
	Jun-11	17114, 17115, 17117
	Jul-11	17118, 17120
	Aug-11	
	Sep-11	17122, 17123, 17124, 17125, 17126, 17130
Oct-11	17134, 17135, 17136, 17137	
Nov-11	17140, 17141, 17142, 17143, 17144	
Dec-11	17146, 17147, 17148, 17149	
Jan-12	17152, 17155	
Feb-12	17158, 17160	
Mar-12	17162, 17166, 17172	
Apr-12	17175	
May-12	17178, 17179, 17180	
Jun-12	17184, 17186, 17188	
Jul-12	17189	
Aug-12		
Sep-12	17190, 17191, 17192, 17193, 17194	

continues

Country	Month-Year	National Debate in the Dataset (No. or Code of Debate or Date)
Germany	Oct-12	17198, 17199, 17200, 17201, 17202
	Nov-12	17204, 17206, 17207, 17209, 17212
	Dec-12	17214
	Jan-13	17217
	Feb-13	17222, 17225
	Mar-13	17227, 17229, 17231, 27232
	Apr-13	17234, 17237
	May-13	17240, 17241
	Jun-13	17246
	Jul-13	
	Aug-13	
	Sep-13	17253
	Oct-13	
	Nov-13	18002, 18003
	Dec-13	18005
	Jan-14	18009, 18010, 18011
Feb-14		
Mar-14	18021	
Apr-14	18028, 18029	
France	Sep-07	
	Oct-07	
	Nov-07	
	Dec-07	
	Jan-08	
	Feb-08	11022008 S2 Q
	Mar-08	
	Apr-08	
	May-08	
	Jun-08	
	Jul-08	22072008 eco
	Aug-08	
	Sep-08	
	Oct-08	07102008 S2 Q ; 08102008 S1 EU ; 14102008 S2 EU ; 21102008 S1 Q
	Nov-08	18112008 S2 Q ; 25112008 S1 EU
	Dec-08	09122008 S2 Q ; 10122008 S1 EU ; 17122008 S1 Q
	Jan-09	06012009 S2 Q
	Feb-09	03022009 S2 Q
	Mar-09	03032009 S1 Q ; 10032009 S1 Q ; 17032009 S2 eco ; 18032009 S1 Q ; 31032009 S1 Q
	Apr-09	01042009 S1 Q ; 07042009 S1 Q ; 08042009 S1 Q ; 29042009 S1 Q
	May-09	12052009 S1 Q ; 19052009 Q ; 27052009 S1 Q
	Jun-09	03062009 S1 Q ; 09062009 S1 EU ; 16062009 S1 Q
	Jul-09	
	Aug-09	
	Sep-09	
	Oct-09	07102009 S1 EU ; 14102009 S1 EU
	Nov-09	
	Dec-09	01122009 S1 Q ; 03122009 S2 eco ; 09122009 S1 EU
Jan-10		
Feb-10	16022010 S2 Q	
Mar-10		
Apr-10	27042010 S2 Q ; 28042010 S1 Q	
May-10	04052010 S1 Q ; 11052010 S2 Q ; 12052010 Q ; 18052010 S2 Q ; 19052010 S1 Q	
Jun-10	09062010 S1 Q ; 10062010 S1 eco ; 10062010 S2 eco ; 10062010 S3 eco ; 15062010 S1 Q ; 16062010 S1 EU	
Jul-10		

continues

Country	Month-Year	National Debate in the Dataset (No. or Code of Debate or Date)
France	Aug-10	
	Sep-10	
	Oct-10	11102010 eco ; 25102010 EU ; 27102010 S1 Q
	Nov-10	02112010 S2 Q ; 17112010 S2 Q ; 30112010 S1 Q
	Dec-10	02122010 S1 eco ; 07122010 S2 eco ; 08122010 S1 EU ; 15122010 S1 Q ; 21122010 Q
	Jan-11	11012011 S1 Q ; 25012011 S1 Q ; 26012011 S1 Q
	Feb-11	15022011 S1 Q
	Mar-11	15032011 S1 Q ; 16032011 S1 EU ; 23032011 S1 Q ; 29032011 S2 Q
	Apr-11	
	May-11	02052011 EU ; 03052011 S1 eco ; 03052011 S2 eco ; 04052011 S1 eco ; 04052011 S2 eco ; 18052011 S1 Q
	Jun-11	09062011 S1 eco ; 09062011 S2 eco ; 15062011 S1 EU ; 21062011 S1 Q ; 22062011 S1 Q ; 28062011 S2 eco ; 29062011 S1 Q
	Jul-11	05072011 S1 Q ; 13072011 S1 eco ; 13072011 S2 Q
	Aug-11	
	Sep-11	07092011 S2 Q
	Oct-11	11102011 S1 Q ; 12102011 S1 EU ; 19102011 S1 Q ; 24102011 eco ; 25102011 S1 Q ; 26102011 S1 Q
	Nov-11	02112011 S2 Q ; 29112011 S1 Q ; 30112011 S1 Q
	Dec-11	06122011 S2 EU ; 07122011 Q ; 13122011 Q
	Jan-12	18012012 S1 Q
	Feb-12	15022012 S1 Q ; 16022012 S1 EU ; 21022012 S1 Q/EU ; 22022012 S1 Q ; 29022012 S1 EU
	Mar-12	06032012 Q
	Apr-12	
	May-12	
	Jun-12	
	Jul-12	04072012 EU ; 25072012 S1 Q ; 31072012 Q
	Aug-12	
	Sep-12	25092012 S1 Q
	Oct-12	02102012 S1 EU ; 03102012 S1 EU/Q ; 03102012 S2 EU ; 08102012 S1 eco ; 08102012 S2 eco ; 09102012 S1 EU/Q ; 10102012 S1 eco ; 15102012 EU ; 17102010 S1 EU ; 24102012 S1 Q
	Nov-12	19112012 eco ; 27112012 S2 Q/EU
	Dec-12	12122012 S1 EU ; 19122012 S1 Q
	Jan-13	
	Feb-13	06022013 S1 Q ; 12022013 S1 Q ; 20022013 S1 EU/Q
	Mar-13	13032013 S1 Q ; 20032013 S1 Q
Apr-13	23042013 S3 EU	
May-13	15052013 S1 Q	
Jun-13	04062013 S1 Q ; 26062013 S1 Q	
Jul-13		
Aug-13		
Sep-13		
Oct-13	23102013 S1 Q	
Nov-13		
Dec-13	17122013 S1 Q	
Jan-14	30012014 S3 EU	
Feb-14	26022014 S1 Q	
Mar-14		
Apr-14		

continues


Country	Month-Year	National Debate in the Dataset (No. or Code of Debate or Date)
Italy	Sep-07	
	Oct-07	
	Nov-07	06 11 2007 L, 14 11 2007 Q
	Dec-07	
	Jan-08	14 01 2008 L EU
	Feb-08	12 02 2008 Q
	Mar-08	
	Apr-08	
	May-08	
	Jun-08	23 06 2008 L
	Jul-08	"01 07 2008 L EU, S 23 07 2008, 30 07 2008 L EU S1, 31 07 2008 L EU S2"
	Aug-08	
	Sep-08	
	Oct-08	09 10 2008 Q EU, 20 10 2008 L, 30 10 2008 EU
	Nov-08	20 11 2008 L, 24 11 2008 Q EU
	Dec-08	05 12 2008 Q EU
	Jan-09	12 01 2009 L, 20 01 2009 L EU
	Feb-09	
	Mar-09	
	Apr-09	20 04 2009 EU, 20 04-2009 L EU, 22 04 2009 L EU, 29 04- 2009 EU
	May-09	20 05 2009 EU, 18 05 2009 L EU
	Jun-09	
	Jul-09	22 07 2009 L, S 28 07 2009 L, S 31 07 2009 L EU S1, S 31 07 2009 L EU S2
	Aug-09	
	Sep-09	14 09 2009 L, 22 09 2009 L EU, 22 09 2009 Q EU
	Oct-09	
	Nov-09	12 11 2009 L EU, 13 11 2009 L, 16 11 2009 L EU S1, 17 11 2009 L EU S2, 18 11 2009 L EU S3, 19 11 2009 L EU S4, 24 11 2009 L S1, 24 11 2009 L S2
	Dec-09	
	Jan-10	19 01 2010 Q EU
	Feb-10	
	Mar-10	
	Apr-10	19 04 2010 L EU, 20 04 2010 L EU S1, 21 04 2010 L EU S2
May-10	06 05 2010 L EU, 19 05 2010 L EU	
Jun-10		
Jul-10	13 07 2010 Q EU	
Aug-10		
Sep-10	29 09 2010 L	
Oct-10	13 10 2010, 26 10 2010	
Nov-10	23 11 2010 L EU	
Dec-10		
Jan-11	31 01 2011	
Feb-11	01 02 2011, 15 02 2011 I EU, 23 02 2011 L, 24 02 2011 S2, 25 02 2011 S3	
Mar-11		
Apr-11	07 04 2011 Q EU, 28 04 2011 L EU	
May-11		
Jun-11	15 06 2011 S1, 16 06 2011 S2, 22 06 2011 S3, 23 06 2011	
Jul-11	15 07 2011	
Aug-11	30 08 2011 L	
Sep-11	12 09 2011, 06 09 2011 Q EU S1, 07 09 2011 Q EU S2	
Oct-11		

continues

Country	Month-Year	National Debate in the Dataset (No. or Code of Debate or Date)
Italy	Nov-11	S 14 11 2011, 23 11 2011
	Dec-11	05 12 2011 L, 08 12 2011, 14 12 2011, 20 12 2011 Q EU
	Jan-12	12 01 2012 L EU
	Feb-12	
	Mar-12	12 03 2012 Q EU, 05 03 2012
	Apr-12	
	May-12	
	Jun-12	13 06 2012 Q EU, 26 06 2012 Q EU, 27 06 2012 Q EU
	Jul-12	05 07 2012 L EU, 18 07 2012 Q EU S1, 19 07 2012 Q EU S2, S 30 07 2012
	Aug-12	
	Sep-12	
	Oct-12	
	Nov-12	
	Dec-12	S 04 12 2012, S 06 12 2012
	Jan-13	
	Feb-13	
	Mar-13	15 03 2013 L EU
	Apr-13	29 04 2013 L
	May-13	06 05 2013, 21 05 2013
	Jun-13	25 06 2013
	Jul-13	31 07 2013 S1, 31 07 2013 S2
	Aug-13	
	Sep-13	
	Oct-13	
Nov-13		
Dec-13	11 12 2013 Q EU, 20 12 2013	
Jan-14	13 01 2014 Q EU, 22 01 2014 L S1, 27 01 2014 L S2	
Feb-14		
Mar-14	29 03 2014 I EU	
Apr-14	28 04 2014	

Note: For France and Italy, the initials refer to specific categories of debate. For France: 'EU' refers to a debate directly related to the Euro crisis; 'Q' refers to a debate containing a question to the government on the Euro crisis; 'eco' refers to an economic topic that indirectly touches upon the EU management of the crisis; 'S' refers to the session of the debate. For Italy: 'L' refers to a debate focused on legislative activity; 'EU' and 'Q EU' refer to a debate on the EU or a debate containing a question to the government on the Euro crisis, respectively.

Figure A.4: Parliamentary Debates on the EU crisis as a Rate of All Parliamentary Debates



The plots show the relative frequency of parliamentary debates on the EU (grey bars) for France, Germany and Italy in the selected period, by country.

Table A.11: Coding of Pro-Scrutiny Sentiment: Key Word Dictionary

Scrutiny & Supervision of EU Institutions

Pro	Contra
(Parliamentary) Scrutiny	Supranational Governance
Surveillance (Mechanisms)	Independent European Institutions
Parliamentary Mandate	European Mandate
Oversight	Supranational Competence
(Inter-)parliamentary Coordination	Open Method of Coordination
National Supervision	European Superstate
Accountability to Parliaments (of, e.g., ECB)	Institutional Autonomy (of, e.g. ECB)
National Safeguards	Centralization
(Procedural) Transparency	Transfers of power to EU institutions
Vigilance	Solidarity
Sovereignty of National Parliaments	European Competencies

This list corresponds to the ‘dictionary’ used to perform the content analysis and count of key words in the parliamentary debates. The words were translated into Germany, French and Italian by native speakers and are available upon request.

Table A.12: German parliamentary debate data by representative political parties

	CDU	FDP	SPD	LINKE
Average seats by party based on 2005, 2009 and 2013 elections	259	82	187	65
<i>Pro-Oversight terms (entire category) associated with debates, %</i>	10.4	2.8	1.7	0.8
<i>Surveillance</i>	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
<i>Parliamentary Coordination</i>	0.6	0.2	0.0	0.1
<i>Parliamentary Mandate</i>	3.2	0.8	0.6	0.1
<i>Parliamentary Safeguards</i>	1.5	0.4	0.2	0.1
<i>Oversight</i>	1.0	0.3	0.2	0.1
<i>Sovereignty</i>	1.5	0.5	0.2	0.1
<i>Scrutiny</i>	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.1
<i>Transparency</i>	2.1	0.4	0.3	0.1

This table shows the relative frequency (%) of the dictionary-based key terms associated with four representative German parties in the Bundestag between 2007 and 2014: CDU, FDP, SPD and Linke. The top of the table indicates the party seats by which the raw frequencies were standardized.

Table A.13: Most active German MPs at selected debates

CDU	FDP	SPD	LINKE
Michael Fuchs	Otto Solms	Hubertus Heil	Axel Troost
Bartholomaeus Kal b	Bjoern Saenger	Carsten Sieling	Michael Schlecht
Norbert Barthle	Otto Fricke	Michael Roth	Dieter Dehm
Hans Michelbach	Martin Lindner	Manfred Zöllmer	Alexander Ulrich
Ralph Brinkhaus	Joachim Spatz	Carsten Schneider	Richard Pitterle
Peter Aumer	Frank Schäffler	Axel Schäfer	Andrej Hunko
Gunther Krichbaum	Volker Wissing	Klaus Barthel	Barbara Hoell
Thomas Silberhorn	Florian Toncar	Joachim Poss	Ilja Seifert
Detlef Self	Martin Zell	Jens Zimmermann	Herbert Schui
Michael Meister	Carl-Ludwig Thiele	Ludwig Stiegler	Gesine Löttsch
Steffen Kampeter	Markus Löning	Nina Hauer	
Klaus-Peter Flosbach	Daniel Volk	Frank Schwabe	
Michael Stuebgen	Werner Hoyer	Ortwin Runde	
Bettina Kudla	Michael Link	Reinhard Schultz	
Leo Dautzenberg	Oliver Luksic	Garrelt Duin	
Eduard Oswald		Kurt Bodewig	
Eckhardt Rehberg		Joerg-Otto Spiller	
Thomas Bareiss		Eva Hoegl	
Otto Bernhardt		Lothar Binding	
Johann Wadehui		Angelica Schwall	
Joachim Pfeiffer			

This table shows the names of MPs that most frequently contributed to debates on the EU crisis (>3 contributions), by political party.

Table A.14: Parliamentary Debates and EU Scrutiny Sentiment: Summary Statistics

	Plenary Debates on the EU			Pro-EU Scrutiny Net Words (ln)		
	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
Germany	1.9	0	6	.428	-1.79	3.74
France	1.7	0	10	.616	-.51	2.68
Italy	1.2	0	8	.177	-1.79	2.88

The table describes the monthly frequency of plenary debates on the EU and the counts of pro-scrutiny words (logged "support for scrutiny" words minus logged "anti-scrutiny" words) for the three selected Euro countries.

Table A.15: The Great Recession and Parliamentary Debates on Oversight of EU Institutions: Relative Frequency of Debates

	<i>Y: Rate of EU Debates δ</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Rate of EU Debates $_{t-1}$	-0.90*** (0.097)	-0.92*** (0.11)	-0.91*** (0.089)	-0.94*** (0.10)
ECB Deposit Rate $_{t-1}$	-0.053** (0.021)	-0.26** (0.13)	-0.061*** (0.020)	-0.26** (0.13)
ECB Deposit Rate δ	-0.15* (0.084)	-0.18 (0.13)	-0.18* (0.10)	-0.19 (0.13)
Greek 10-year bond yield $_{t-1}$	0.006* (0.003)	0.026** (0.011)	0.006* (0.003)	0.027** (0.012)
Greek 10-year bond yield δ	0.007 (0.010)	0.009 (0.013)	0.009 (0.009)	0.010 (0.012)
Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.003* (0.0018)
Debt to GDP δ	0.001 (0.015)	0.005 (0.021)	0.010 (0.023)	0.012 (0.027)
Inflation $_{t-1}$	-0.15*** (0.052)	-0.13*** (0.044)	-0.11*** (0.038)	-0.11*** (0.034)
Inflation δ	-0.028 (0.068)	-0.035 (0.056)	-0.042 (0.062)	-0.045 (0.053)
Government Ideology $_{t-1}$	0.084 (0.084)	0.12 (0.11)	0.083 (0.083)	0.12 (0.11)
Government Ideology δ	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)
ECB Deposit Rate $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		0.003* (0.001)		0.003* (0.001)
ECB Deposit Rate δ \times Debt to GDP δ		0.028 (0.022)		0.015 (0.021)
Greek 10-year bond yield $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		-0.002* (0.001)		-0.002* (0.001)
Greek 10-year bond yield δ \times Debt to GDP δ		-0.013 (0.013)		-0.008 (0.014)
Season $_{t-1}$			0.034*** (0.012)	0.033** (0.013)
Season δ			0.060*** (0.002)	0.056*** (0.003)
Constant	0.50*** (0.072)	0.44*** (0.11)	0.45*** (0.058)	0.37*** (0.12)
N (Countries)	183 (3)	183 (3)	183 (3)	183 (3)
R ²	0.45	0.48	0.47	0.50

The table reports linear ECM estimation coefficients of the outcome *Rate of EU Debates* δ . Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.

Table A.16: The Great Recession and Parliamentary Debates on EU Oversight in the Eurozone: Control for EU Institutional Measures

	<i>Y: No. Parliamentary Debates δ</i>		<i>Y: Net Pro-Scrutiny Sentiment δ</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
No. Parliamentary Debates $_{t-1}$	-0.96 ^{***} (0.11)	-0.98 ^{***} (0.12)		
Net Pro-Scrutiny Sentiment $_{t-1}$			-0.85 ^{***} (0.072)	-0.91 ^{***} (0.091)
ECB Deposit Rate $_{t-1}$	-0.32 ^{***} (0.054)	-0.50 ^{**} (0.22)	0.11 (0.22)	-1.14 ^{***} (0.12)
ECB Deposit Rate δ	-1.59 ^{**} (0.67)	-2.12 ^{**} (1.01)	0.84 ^{***} (0.31)	0.57 ^{***} (0.084)
Greek 10-year bond yield $_{t-1}$	0.048 ^{***} (0.019)	0.21 ^{***} (0.026)	-0.012 [*] (0.0068)	-0.15 ^{***} (0.031)
Greek 10-year bond yield δ	-0.083 ^{**} (0.037)	-0.053 (0.039)	-0.042 (0.029)	-0.073 ^{**} (0.030)
Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$	-0.014 ^{***} (0.002)	0.001 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.026 ^{***} (0.002)
Debt to GDP δ	0.041 (0.086)	0.080 (0.13)	0.026 (0.021)	0.068 (0.055)
Inflation $_{t-1}$	-1.01 ^{***} (0.19)	-0.89 ^{***} (0.22)	-0.66 ^{***} (0.17)	-0.86 ^{***} (0.072)
Inflation δ	-0.48 (0.29)	-0.45 (0.33)	-0.29 ^{***} (0.051)	-0.36 ^{***} (0.049)
Government Ideology $_{t-1}$	0.084 (0.055)	0.18 (0.13)	-0.39 ^{***} (0.097)	-0.29 ^{***} (0.085)
Government Ideology δ	0.13 (0.85)	0.16 (0.91)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Introduction of EFSF	0.64 (0.65)	0.58 (0.65)	-0.45 ^{***} (0.096)	-0.27 [*] (0.15)
Expansion of EFSF	-0.19 (0.70)	-0.25 (0.73)	0.50 ^{**} (0.23)	0.38 [*] (0.20)
Introduction of ESM	-1.16 ^{***} (0.032)	-1.09 ^{***} (0.022)	-0.34 ^{***} (0.12)	-0.21 (0.15)
ECB Deposit Rate $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		0.003 (0.002)		0.015 ^{***} (0.002)
ECB Deposit Rate δ \times Debt to GDP δ		0.28 (0.25)		0.15 ^{***} (0.030)
Greek 10-year bond yield $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		-0.002 ^{***} (0.001)		0.002 ^{***} (0.001)
Greek 10-year bond yield δ \times Debt to GDP δ		-0.095 ^{***} (0.037)		0.064 ^{***} (0.015)
Constant	2.67 ^{***} (0.44)	1.14 ^{***} (0.31)	1.17 ^{***} (0.32)	3.26 ^{***} (0.21)
N (Countries)	237 (3)	237 (3)	103 (3)	103 (3)
R ²	0.49	0.51	0.54	0.62

The table reports linear ECM estimation coefficients of the outcome *Number Parliamentary Debates* δ for models 1 and 2, and outcome *Net Pro-Scrutiny Sentiment* δ for models 3 and 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.17: The Great Recession and Parliamentary Debates on EU Oversight in the Eurozone: Bootstrapped Regressions

	<i>Y: Net Pro-Scrutiny Sentiment δ</i>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Net Pro-Scrutiny Sentiment $_{t-1}$	-0.89*** (0.11)	-0.89*** (0.11)	-0.89*** (0.10)	-0.89*** (0.11)
ECB Deposit Rate $_{t-1}$	-1.21** (0.57)	-1.21*** (0.39)	-1.21*** (0.38)	-1.21*** (0.37)
ECB Deposit Rate δ	0.39 (0.34)	0.39 (0.37)	0.39 (0.32)	0.39 (0.35)
Greek 10-year bond yield $_{t-1}$	-0.15* (0.082)	-0.15** (0.070)	-0.15** (0.066)	-0.15** (0.074)
Greek 10-year bond yield δ	-0.066*** (0.021)	-0.066*** (0.023)	-0.066*** (0.020)	-0.066*** (0.019)
Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$	-0.027** (0.011)	-0.027*** (0.010)	-0.027** (0.011)	-0.027** (0.012)
Debt to GDP δ	0.090 (0.081)	0.090 (0.075)	0.090 (0.071)	0.090 (0.086)
Inflation $_{t-1}$	-0.88*** (0.28)	-0.88*** (0.30)	-0.88*** (0.27)	-0.88*** (0.27)
Inflation δ	-0.36* (0.19)	-0.36* (0.20)	-0.36* (0.19)	-0.36* (0.20)
Government Ideology $_{t-1}$	-0.28* (0.17)	-0.28** (0.14)	-0.28 (0.17)	-0.28* (0.16)
Government Ideology δ	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
ECB Deposit Rate $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$	0.016*** (0.006)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)
ECB Deposit Rate δ Debt to GDP δ	0.20 (0.16)	0.20 (0.13)	0.20 (0.22)	0.20 (0.15)
Greek 10-year bond yield $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$	0.001 (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Greek 10-year bond yield δ \times Debt to GDP δ	0.070 (0.067)	0.070* (0.040)	0.070 (0.067)	0.070 (0.056)
Constant	3.29*** (0.99)	3.29*** (0.92)	3.29*** (1.02)	3.29*** (1.04)
N (Countries)	103 (3)	103 (3)	103 (3)	103 ((3)
R ²	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61

The table reports linear bootstrapped estimation coefficients of *Net Pro-Scrutiny Sentiment δ* with four different seeds (100 replications per regression). Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01.

Table A.18: The Great Recession and Parliamentary Debates on Oversight of EU Institutions: Fixed Effects

	<i>Y: No. Parliamentary Debates</i>		<i>Y: Net Pro-Scrutiny Sentiment</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ECB Deposit Rate $_{t-1}$	-0.19 (0.17)	0.032 (0.53)	0.31 (0.26)	0.21 (0.34)
ECB Deposit Rate δ	-0.51 (0.72)	-0.66 (1.02)	0.98 (0.61)	0.78 (0.65)
Greek 10-year bond yield $_{t-1}$	0.071* (0.042)	0.035 (0.040)	0.023 (0.024)	-0.084*** (0.016)
Greek 10-year bond yield δ	-0.011 (0.12)	0.010 (0.12)	-0.009 (0.029)	-0.034 (0.029)
Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$	0.004 (0.018)	0.001 (0.014)	-0.036** (0.017)	-0.029 (0.021)
Debt to GDP δ	0.10 (0.12)	0.10 (0.14)	-0.013 (0.048)	0.042 (0.082)
Inflation $_{t-1}$	-0.25 (0.58)	-0.18 (0.59)	-0.41 (0.36)	-0.49 (0.37)
Inflation δ	-0.10 (0.67)	-0.094 (0.68)	-0.25 (0.20)	-0.29 (0.23)
Government Ideology $_{t-1}$	0.052 (0.100)	0.093 (0.14)	-0.45*** (0.071)	-0.39*** (0.078)
Government Ideology δ	0.32 (0.33)	0.36 (0.30)	-0.066 (0.22)	-0.037 (0.20)
ECB Deposit Rate $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		0.001 (0.001)		0.005*** (0.002)
ECB Deposit Rate δ Debt to GDP δ		0.21 (0.49)		0.30*** (0.10)
Greek 10-year bond yield $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		0.001** (0.000)		0.001*** (0.000)
Greek 10-year bond yield δ \times Debt to GDP δ		-0.085*** (0.024)		0.042 (0.027)
Constant	-0.14 (1.34)	-0.88 (2.39)	1.20 (1.68)	0.20 (1.81)
Country and Year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes
N (Countries)	237 (3)	237 (3)	152 (3)	152 (3)
R ²	0.011	0.016	0.23	0.28

The table reports linear ECM estimation coefficients of the outcome *Number Parliamentary Debates* δ for models 1 and 2, and outcome *Net Pro-Scrutiny Sentiment* δ for models 3 and 4. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table A.19: The Great Recession and Parliamentary Debates on Oversight of EU Institutions: Control for Euroscepticism/Support for Integration

	<i>Y: Net Pro-Scrutiny Sentiment δ</i>	
	(1)	(2)
Net Pro-Scrutiny Sentiment $_{t-1}$	-0.91*** (0.064)	-0.97*** (0.053)
ECB Deposit Rate $_{t-1}$	0.35** (0.17)	-1.12*** (0.22)
ECB Deposit Rate δ	0.90*** (0.093)	0.38*** (0.061)
Greek 10-year bond yield $_{t-1}$	0.001 (0.014)	-0.12*** (0.033)
Greek 10-year bond yield δ	-0.013 (0.029)	-0.052*** (0.015)
Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$	0.001 (0.001)	-0.021*** (0.005)
Debt to GDP δ	0.038 (0.029)	0.045 (0.085)
Government Ideology $_{t-1}$	-0.39*** (0.071)	-0.31*** (0.051)
Government Ideology δ	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Inflation $_{t-1}$	-0.56*** (0.14)	-0.78*** (0.084)
Inflation δ	-0.28*** (0.072)	-0.38*** (0.078)
Net Pro-EU Integration Sentiment $_{t-1}$	-0.011 (0.009)	-0.015 (0.018)
ECB Deposit Rate $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		0.015*** (0.002)
ECB Deposit Rate δ Debt to GDP δ		0.19** (0.075)
Greek 10-year bond yield $_{t-1}$ \times Debt to GDP $_{t-1}$		0.001*** (0.000)
Greek 10-year bond yield δ \times Debt to GDP δ		0.069*** (0.003)
Constant	0.60** (0.25)	2.67*** (0.44)
N	75	75
Countries	3	3
R ²	0.60	0.71

The table reports linear ECM estimation coefficients of *Net Pro-Scrutiny Sentiment δ* . Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.