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Coding scheme

This document reports tables that constitute the full scheme of coding rules for the [UNFCCC Negotiations Dataset](#). The first part lists the excerpts that allowed the identification of each of the bargaining issues coded in the dataset. The second part reports the scales the coders followed to assign values to the established positions.

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**States' Interests at the International Climate
Negotiations: New Measures of Bargaining Positions**

Environmental Politics

1: Issue identification scheme (period 1)

Issue categories	(1) Reference in the literature	(2) Reference in ENB archives	
		Bonn (01) report	Buenos Aires (04) report
Assignment of abatement units (ERUs/AAUs /CERs) for 1st commitment period	In an attempt to avoid overselling of credits by Parties, a commitment period reserve (CPR) was introduced. This CPR requirement stipulates that each Annex I Party must make sure that its emission credit holdings do not drop below 90% of their assigned amount (AA: emissions allocation), or 100% of its last reviewed inventory, whichever is lowest (Dessai and Schipper, 2003, GEC)	<i>On Article 17, Parties failed to reach agreement on several elements relating to the commitment period reserve, including whether to consider ERUs and CERs for the first commitment period. Delegates agreed to revisit the draft decisions pending deliberations on Article 7.4. AUSTRALIA, JAPAN and CANADA said that Parties, upon establishment of their assigned amount and until expiration of the additional period for fulfilling commitments, "should" not make a transfer resulting in these holdings falling below the required commitment period reserve level. The EU, G-77/CHINA, SAMOA and SWITZERLAND supported the use of "shall." SWITZERLAND noted the need for mandatory requirements to maintain the integrity of the Bonn Agreements. [...] SAMOA and the G-77/CHINA expressed concern with the early start of projects and their eligibility for ERUs as of 2008.</i>	<i>The debate could be viewed as one between buyers and sellers of carbon sequestration credits. The buyers, including the EU, Norway and Switzerland, were mostly concerned about the quality of the product and sought conditions that would protect their investments and maintain credibility with environmental NGOs. Some insisted on rigorous criteria for socioeconomic and environmental impacts, non-permanence and leakage. The sellers, including Bolivia, Colombia, and other Latin American countries, on the other hand, strove for favorable market conditions, aimed at avoiding crippling transaction costs. They sought more flexible crediting periods, an insurance approach to credits that would add value to what otherwise appears as a mere "rent" of emissions reductions, and environmental and social impact assessments.</i>
CDM/JI requirement to engage	While most issues were relatively uncontroversial to translate into legal text, others required more negotiations, such as the eligibility requirements to participate in the mechanisms and the nature of the credits earned from trading (Huq, 2002, Climate Policy; Michaelowa and Tol, 2002, IEA)	<i>PAKISTAN urged strong, clear and flexible rules on the CDM based on principles of equity and sustainability, and stressed that the CDM and other mechanisms should not be a substitute for long-term emissions reductions. THAILAND said it would like to see equal treatment of modalities and rules between mechanisms and a balance between adaptation and mitigation activities. CHILE said the CDM would facilitate access to technology and address local environmental problems, and urged the IPCC to "speed up" work on procedures for good practice guidance and permanence. URUGUAY noted its willingness to participate in CDM sinks activities, and highlighted national efforts to prepare for the CDM.</i>	<i>The final round-table on assessment of progress at the national, regional and international levels to fulfill the promise and objective enshrined in the climate change agreements, including the scientific, information, policy and financial aspects was co-chaired by Fernando Tudela Abad, Mexico, and Jorgen Trittin, Germany. Co-Chair Tudela Abad said the CDM faces challenges arising from the delay in the Protocol's entry into force, limited markets, and crippling transaction costs. Co-Chair Trittin said the UNFCCC obliges all Parties to tackle climate change through the mechanisms [...]</i>
Differentiated responsibilities	Further elements of the compliance regime include taking into account the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (Yamin et al, 2001, IEA)	<i>On the consequences applied by the facilitative branch, most delegates had agreed that these be applied "taking into account," rather than "on the basis of," the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.</i>	<i>Iran underscored the benefits of economic diversification and stressed Parties' common but differentiated responsibilities. [...] In the SBSTA Plenary held on Wednesday, 3 December, delegates discussed the review of the scientific and methodological aspects of the Brazilian proposal for differentiated emissions reduction targets according to the impact of their historic emissions on temperature rise.</i>

Uncertainty of measures	<p>Many methodological issues, such as non-permanence, additionality, leakage, uncertainties and socio-economic and environmental impacts, etc., remain to be tackled by the UNFCCC's Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the IPCC (Dessai and Schipper, 2003)</p>	<p><i>On the conclusions relating to the IPCC Third Assessment Report (TAR), SAUDI ARABIA and KUWAIT proposed deferring the issue [...] The EU and others urged adoption of the conclusions. Following further informal consultations, compromise text was agreed. References to assessing "the implications" of the TAR were deleted, and the scope of the proposed workshop on the TAR was amended to include reference to "scientific uncertainty" and to the "effects of measures." {...} SAUDI ARABIA advocated retaining bracketed text regarding reporting on Article 2.3 (adverse effects of P&Ms)</i></p>	<p><i>The Russian Federation said that remaining uncertainties regarding whether mitigation efforts will be effective for reducing climate change justify pursuing adaptation. {...} On the agenda item addressing the implementation of UNFCCC Article 4.8 and 4.9 (adverse affects), the EU and US emphasized the need to discuss the implementation of decision 5/CP.7 (implementation of UNFCCC Article 4.8 and 4.9 on adverse effects) as a sub-item. The G-77/China and others proposed that the agenda sub-item not be restricted to decision 5/CP.7, but address all matters related to Article 4.8.</i></p>
Legally binding protocol	<p>The US had traditionally been a proponent of a strong, legally binding compliance system. Their withdrawal left remaining "key ratification" countries, Australia, Japan and Russia to throw their weight around so that the final decision over whether or not the system would be legally binding will be taken at the first meeting of the Parties after the entry into force of the Protocol (Dessai and Schipper, 2003)</p>	<p><i>COP-6 President Jan Pronk [...] said the Bonn Agreements demonstrate the effectiveness of multilateralism and international cooperation in solving global problems within the framework of the UN. He expressed confidence that COP-7 will complete the process of translating the Bonn Agreements into legal language, and bring work on the Buenos Aires Plan of Action (BAPA) to a successful conclusion. {...} On ratification of the Protocol, NEW ZEALAND announced its intention to ratify in time for the WSSD, adding that it was currently the only Umbrella Group Party to have made such a commitment, although he predicted that it "will be in good company before too long."</i></p>	<p><i>The first face was that of the ongoing negotiations aimed at strengthening and building on the original treaty and bringing the Kyoto Protocol to fruition. While these official negotiations enjoyed some progress at COP-9, including an agreement on the use of sinks in the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), this side of the meeting could hardly be seen as an overwhelming success.</i></p>
Carbon emissions trade affiliation (by 1st period)	<p>The enforcement branch [of the Compliance Committee] will determine if an Annex I Party is in noncompliance with its assigned amount, methodological and reporting requirements, and the mechanisms' eligibility requirements, and apply the agreed consequences, which include: restoration of 130% of the AA in the next commitment period, preparation of a compliance action plan and suspension of emissions trading (Najam, Huq, Sokona, 2003, Climate Policy)</p>	<p><i>On the draft COP decision on Article 17, AUSTRALIA, opposed by the G-77/CHINA, SAMOA and the EU, proposed deleting the recommendation that MOP-1 adopt the decision on emissions trading, arguing that the principles, modalities, rules and guidelines for trading should be defined by the COP.</i></p>	<p><i>The NETHERLANDS, for the EU, Bulgaria, Romania and Turkey, expressed continued commitment to addressing climate change with the launch of an emissions trading scheme in January 2005.</i></p>

<p>Eligibility of LULUCF and sinks under CDM</p>	<p>Afforestation and reforestation projects are allowed in the CDM, but only during the first commitment period, up to a ceiling of 1% of the fivefold amount of a Party's 1990 emissions (Dessai and Schipper, 2003, GEC)</p>	<p><i>In the section on designated operational entities, JAPAN, supported by several Parties, proposed adding references to "enhancements by sinks" in order to reflect the acceptance of afforestation and reforestation under the CDM in the Bonn Agreements. The EU, NEW ZEALAND, BRAZIL, INDIA and CHINA opposed this addition. They supported a discussion on the issue within the context of the draft COP decision that elaborates on the criteria of eligibility of LULUCF activities in the first and future commitment periods</i></p>	<p><i>NEW ZEALAND noted the advantages of LULUCF rules and mechanisms, while UGANDA stressed the uncertainties of impacts on individual countries. The EU called for discussions on amendments in relation to mechanisms and said LULUCF should focus on reference levels, force majeure, and harvested wood products (HWPs).</i></p>
<p>LULUCF accounting</p>	<p>The issue of carbon sinks has been controversial ever since its surprise inclusion in the Kyoto Protocol (Article 3.3 and 3.4). Sinks are one of the major rifts between the EU and the US at the failed Hague conference. Most sinks provisions were settled in Bonn to the benefit of the Umbrella Group (Nobles and Scholes, 2001, Sinks and the Kyoto Protocol)</p>	<p><i>Development of good practice guidance and other information for the LULUCF sector: IPCC Chair outlined the future of the IPCC and highlighted the LULUCF work programme under the IPCC National Greenhouse Gas Inventory programme, which focuses on: good practice guidance; definitions for direct human-induced degradation and devegetation, and inventory and reporting options [...]</i> <i>The EU, supported by INDONESIA, proposed that the SBSTA develop terms of reference for IPCC work on CDM modalities for LULUCF during its current session. The US, RUSSIAN FEDERATION, CANADA and AUSTRALIA cautioned that the draft decision on LULUCF has yet to be finalized.</i></p>	<p><i>AUSTRALIA, supported by the EU, US, JAPAN and CANADA, looked forward to continued discussions on harvested wood products (HWP). AOSIS said that reporting and accounting for HWP should be driven by good science and not by market incentives. AUSTRALIA, supported by CANADA and JAPAN, tabled a written proposal for an open-ended policy dialogue on LULUCF and the EU recommended that SBSTA hold a LULUCF workshop in 2005. CANADA, supported by JAPAN, EU and NORWAY, urged the adoption of the good practice guidance at COP-10.</i></p>
<p>Industry proportional impact</p>	<p>Though it was considered a technical matter, it quickly became politicised, dividing Parties over the smallest of details. The remaining "crunch" issues were the truly cross-cutting and difficult ones present in discussions in other places. These had been set aside, particularly so that agreement could be reached on sinks and mechanisms (Dessai and Schipper, 2003, GEC)</p>	<p><i>NORWAY, supported by JAPAN, proposed amendments whereby furthering project activities should, as appropriate, address the proportional impact required under Protocol Article 10 (continuing implementation of existing commitments). The G-77/CHINA, BRAZIL, CHINA, SAUDI ARABIA and THAILAND opposed the amendments.</i></p>	<p><i>Iceland expressed concern that, for Parties with very low emissions baselines, a single project (e.g. construction of an aluminium smelter) could lead to a disproportionate percentage increase in emissions.</i></p>

<p>LULUCF emissions reductions</p>	<p>The outstanding issues [on afforestation and reforestation] included the reporting of sinks activities, mentioned above, and the nature of sink credits. Many methodological issues, such as non-permanence, additionality, leakage, uncertainties and socio-economic and environmental impacts, etc., remain to be tackled (Dessai and Schipper, 2003, GEC)</p>	<p><i>Regarding the paragraph on general information to be reported for activities under Protocol Article 3.3 (afforestation, deforestation, reforestation) and 3.4 (additional activities), AUSTRALIA, supported by [...] the RUSSIAN FEDERATION and EU, cautioned that in many instances the guideline text is more detailed than that contained in the draft decision on LULUCF from COP-6 Part II. He stressed that details should be left to be defined in the IPCC good practice guidance. SAUDI ARABIA proposed introducing additional subparagraphs requiring Parties to submit information on, inter alia, how the reported activities exclude carbon dioxide removals due to indirect human-induced effects.</i></p>	<p><i>The EU, with the help of Canada, would present reporting tables on sectoral background data for LULUCF based on IPCC GPG.</i></p>
<p>GHG reduction in long term</p>	<p>The reporting requirements on [reductions under] Article 3.14 were repeatedly discussed (Huq, 2002)</p>	<p><i>Greenhouse gas inventories: Chair Dovland recalled the SBSTA-12 invitation for Annex I submissions of experiences in preparing greenhouse gas inventories using IPCC good practice guidance [...]. Bunker fuels [...] The EU reiterated concerns about increasing greenhouse gas emissions from international aviation and called for guidelines compatible with the Protocol for emissions allocation methodologies. [...] SWITZERLAND proposed that the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) continue initiatives on guidelines on emissions reductions. The G-77/CHINA proposed that work take place within the framework of Protocol Article 2.2.</i></p>	<p><i>Annex I Parties consolidated the view that the Secretariat should guide on the further development of the Article 6 information network clearing house. It should outline the characteristics and elements of the first phase of work, including to: target Parties, but be accessible to the general public; focus on the education and public awareness components of Article 6</i></p>
<p>Mitigation projects (fund)</p>	<p>Another issue that was under negotiation during COP-6 was frameworks on capacity building for developing countries and for economies in transition (Yamin et al, 2001)</p>	<p><i>The GEF: underlined its commitment to supporting capacity building, technology transfer and adaptation. {...} Regarding the circumstances and needs of developing countries and LDCs, many speakers underscored the need for capacity building, adaptation and technology transfer.</i></p>	<p><i>On Tuesday, 2 December, the GEF highlighted its mitigation initiatives on climate change. Tanzania, for the LDCs, stressed the need for expedited procedures for the approval of NAMAs. China and Brazil urged accelerated funding for second national communications, and Algeria expressed concern about lack of progress and funding.</i></p>
<p>ODA support (10 collaboration)</p>	<p>In particular adaptation, which is finally gaining recognition for addressing climate change, may be a costly enterprise, and funding should be made available through other channels in the context of sustainable development (e.g., bilateral or multilateral agencies). The structure of the UNFCCC regime has made funding a difficult political issue. (Huq and Reid, 2004, IDS Bulletin)</p>	<p><i>The GLOBAL CLIMATE OBSERVING SYSTEM (GCOS) reported on its regional workshop programme and on a proposal for a second assessment of the adequacy of observing systems. He noted concerns over deterioration of existing networks and historical databases and ongoing work to arrest this trend, as well as efforts to exploit new observing methods. Several Parties expressed concern at the deterioration of networks. The EU proposed inviting the GCOS Secretariat to present an interim review of adequacy of networks, addressing national activities, in time for consideration at SBSTA-16. MALAYSIA suggested accessing GEF funds in this area.</i></p>	<p><i>African countries arguing the finer details of LULUCF and CDM in SBSTA seemed unaware of the practical difficulties of implementation being discussed in SBI, where other developing countries were already voicing concerns over their inability to keep up with existing technical requirements, such as the greenhouse gas inventories, and were calling for assistance to improve capacity.</i></p>

International accountability	The remaining “crunch” issues were the truly cross-cutting and difficult ones present in discussions in other places. These had been set aside, particularly so that agreement could be reached on sinks and mechanisms. In fact, discussions on Article 7.4, which establishes the accounting of AAs, had never been held prior to COP-7 (de Elzen and de Moor, 2002, Ecological Economics)	<i>On the procedures for the enforcement branch, the RUSSIAN FEDERATION, opposed by the EU, suggested text reflecting the right for the Party concerned to have a closed hearing [...] On expedited procedures, JAPAN said it would submit a proposal on the procedure for reinstalling mechanisms' eligibility [...] On consequences applied by the enforcement branch, JAPAN, opposed by the EU, proposed deleting the paragraphs providing for consequences in case of non-compliance with Protocol Articles 5.1 (national systems), 5.2 (adjustments), 7.1 (annual inventories) and 7.4.</i>	<i>Japan, supported by Canada and India, but opposed by AOSIS, Brazil and the EU, preferred exempting leakage due to high monitoring costs. The EU suggested the option of an extra percentage of additional removals to account for enforcement.</i>
Systematic observation implementation	The Marrakech Accords set out decisions on reporting whereby Parties are required to report annually on sinks activities, including how these activities are directly human-induced, but failure to meet the quality thresholds will not endanger eligibility to participate in the mechanisms. From 2001 on, sinks estimates should include information on how inventory methodologies have been applied, as well as information to allow units and areas of land to be identifiable (Mace, 2005, RECIEL)	<i>On the start of the annual compilation and accounting of emissions inventories and assigned amounts in the draft COP/MOP-1 decision, delegates preferred the option that requests the Secretariat to start such compilation and accounting in the year that a Party commences reporting under Article 7.1 (inventories); however, emissions inventories for the purpose of compliance with Protocol Article 3 (emissions targets) shall not be compiled until the inventory for the first year of the commitment period is available. {...} the criteria on monitoring, accreditation and verification procedures had been discussed yet differences remained. Outstanding issues included the role of the supervisory committee.</i>	<i>GOOD PRACTICES IN POLICIES AND MEASURES: This issue was addressed by SBSTA on Tuesday, 2 December, and in informal consultations led by Richard Muyungi (Tanzania) and Greg Terrill (Australia). On Tuesday, 2 December, the EU urged Parties to submit reports to the Secretariat on demonstrable progress, and asked SBSTA to identify priority activities and develop a work programme on good practices</i>
Voluntary vs stringent measures	It would be extremely hard to get developing countries to take on commitments, even on a voluntary basis, if developed countries [do not] take the lead in combating climate change, as enshrined in the Convention (Dessai and Schipper, 2003, GEC)	<i>Under Part II, Reporting of Supplementary Information under Article 7.2 (national communications) AUSTRALIA proposed deleting a bracketed section on reporting on mechanisms projects, noting that this would be covered under Article 7.4 {...} while SAMOA supported retaining text on reporting on national arrangements to ensure that LULUCF activities contribute to conservation of biodiversity and sustainable use of natural resources.</i>	<i>AUSTRALIA suggested language for a new paragraph allowing a voluntary review for each year subsequent to the pre-commitment period.</i>
Technology transfer	Financial matters, thoroughly cross-cutting in nature, have always represented a sticking point for all involved (Dessai et al, 2004, EIA)	<i>Parties then considered the guidance to an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC on the LDC Fund. MALI, for the LDCs, underscored a simplified operating procedure of the Fund enabling project approval within four months, and employment of local and regional expertise. The EU suggested that the legal and technical review had not taken into account the guidance document and, with the US, JAPAN, and NORWAY, said that developing guidance to the Fund should be considered at COP-8. UGANDA underscored the urgency of the LDCs' concerns.</i>	<i>In the decision on further guidance on the operation of the LDC Fund (FCCC/CP/2003/L.9), the COP decides to adopt the further guidance to an entity entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the UNFCCC for the operation of the LDC Fund. The COP requests the entity to take into account various elements when developing operational guidelines for funding the implementation of NAPAs</i>

Adaptation projects (funds)	<p>Financial matters, thoroughly cross-cutting in nature, have always represented a sticking point for all involved.</p> <p>This may unfortunately have been enhanced by the creation of three new funds to support the actions outlined in the decisions: an adaptation fund under the Protocol, and a special climate change fund and a fund to address the needs of the least developed countries under the UNFCCC.</p>	<p><i>PORTUGAL said adaptation could promote sustainable development and equity within and across generations. PANAMA, for Central American Parties, drew attention to a new GEF regional adaptation pilot project, and URUGUAY underscored the importance of the Adaptation Fund. BANGLADESH supported the speedy application of the Adaptation Funds</i></p>	<p><i>Special Climate Change Fund: In the SBI Plenary on Tuesday, 2 December, the EU said the SCCF should be used as a catalyst for leveraging additional resources from bilateral and multilateral sources. China urged the establishment of a procedure for the replenishment of the SCCF.</i></p>
Supplementarity of mechanisms	<p>One of the most controversial issues is that of 'supplementarity', i.e., that the usage of the mechanisms should be supplemental to domestic emissions reductions. While the EU argued for a quantitative cap, the Umbrella Group wanted maximum flexibility, which implied no cap (Michaelowa and Tol, 2002, IEA)</p>	<p><i>On participation requirements relating to the procedures and mechanisms, the co-chairs proposed a compromise reproducing language from the Bonn Agreements whereby only Parties that have accepted the agreement on compliance supplementing the Protocol shall be entitled to transfer or acquire credits generated by the use of mechanisms. JAPAN, CANADA and the RUSSIA opposed this proposal. {...} On the reporting of supplementary information on Protocol Article 2.3 (adverse effects of P&Ms) under Article 7.2, JAPAN, AUSTRALIA, and the EU, opposed by SAUDI ARABIA, CHINA and NIGERIA, said the relevant information will be provided in accordance with the guidelines as they relate to Article 3.14.</i></p>	<p><i>SBI expresses appreciation to the Parties that have made their contributions to the core budget in time and in full, and particularly to those Parties that have made contributions to the Trust Fund for Participation in the UNFCCC Process and the Trust Fund for Supplementary Activities, and urges Parties that have not yet made their contributions to the core budget to do so as soon as possible.</i></p>
Accreditation of nuclear energy	<p>Due to their bargaining power, the position prevailed [that] in Bonn, Parties decided to 'refrain' from using nuclear power in JI and CDM projects (Dessai and Schipper, 2003, GEC)</p>	<p><i>The INTERNATIONAL ENERGY AGENCY said it was working on solutions to "marshal market forces" to achieve realistic climate change objectives. He highlighted renewable energy options in combating climate change, while advocating that no possible fuel or technology solution be excluded, noting that carbon-intensive options might be offset by carbon sequestration, or that concerns over nuclear could be resolved.</i></p>	<p><i>The US emphasized public-private partnerships and noted national programmes on carbon sequestration, hydrogen and nuclear energy. GHANA said technology transfer must prioritize know-how and human-resource development.</i></p>
Accreditation of small offset projects	<p>Within the CDM, small-scale projects will be given priority, for example renewables up to 15MW (Ott et al, 2005, JEEPL)</p>	<p><i>On the mechanisms [...] MALAYSIA said the Executive Board should ensure environmental integrity of all projects. URUGUAY noted its willingness to participate in CDM sinks activities, and highlighted national efforts to prepare for the CDM. The RUSSIAN FEDERATION insisted on the removal of limitations on Parties' ability to use the mechanisms.</i></p>	<p><i>Small-scale projects under the CDM: The EU said simplified modalities and procedures for small-scale A&R are a means to facilitate local participation and reduce transaction costs. PERU, with several Latin American Parties, said that at US\$ 6 per ton of CO₂, small-scale A&R projects would not benefit from CDM, given high transaction costs.</i></p>

2: Issue identification scheme (period 2)

Issues categories	(1) Reference in the literature	(2) Reference in ENB archives	
		Poznan (08) report	Durban (11) report
Assignment of ERUs/AAUs for 2nd commitment period reserves	<p>A final concern of some countries [about credits] is that they can alter the incentives that countries face with respect to setting their future caps. In particular, by changing allowance prices in each of the linked systems, a linkage alters the tradeoff that a government faces between the value it can create by issuing additional allowances, and the marginal environmental damage that arises from issuing additional allowances. [Jaffe et al "Linking Tradable Permit Systems: A Key Element of Emerging International Climate Policy Architecture", 2009, p.801]</p>	<p><i>On crediting on the basis of NAMAs, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Egypt, Bolivia and several other developing countries proposed deletion of the text relating to this issue. The Republic of Korea and Sweden, for the EU, preferred retaining the text. The section, containing an option to take no decision on this issue, and an option establishing a NAMA crediting mechanism, was retained in the text.[...] On addressing surplus AAUs, the EU noted that failing to address the issue of AAU surplus and using either current rules or unconstrained gross-net accounting rules for LULUCF would result in increased emissions from the 1990 baseline. Brazil requested that AAU carryover issues be resolved separate from discussions of level of ambition. The EU, Australia and Brazil expressed concern with using actual emissions as a starting point.</i></p>	<p><i>The Gambia, for LDCs, supported by AOSIS, said those aiming to leave the Kyoto Protocol are doing so because they want to do less. She urged the elimination of loopholes, such as carryover of surplus assigned amount units (AAUs) and in accounting rules for LULUCF. Submissions were made by Brazil on QELROs and by AOSIS, Brazil and the African Group on carryover of surplus AAUs.</i></p>
CDM requirement to engage	<p>Developing countries view the quid pro quo between them and developed countries not as, 'action for action,' but as 'action for action plus support' [Jacobs, "Deadline 2015", 2012]</p>	<p><i>On the paragraph on establishing a quota, Canada, supported by Japan, opposed identifying a specific percentage of CERs to come from countries with fewer than ten CDM projects, and Japan preferred language "encouraging parties" rather than "deciding" to use CERs coming from these countries. Ethiopia, supported by Mali, noted that the language already reflects compromise and preferred retaining the text as it stands. Ethiopia, opposed by many countries, but supported by Uganda, proposed that this quota should apply to countries that had fewer than ten projects in the first commitment period. No agreement could be reached on this paragraph and it remains bracketed.</i></p>	<p><i>During informal consultations, some developing countries sought to specifically link participation in the CDM after 2012 to accepting a target under the Kyoto Protocol, which proved to be a major point of discussion.</i></p>
Differentiated responsibilities	<p>Brazil, China, and India explicitly oppose any reclassification of developing countries with higher emissions and higher capacity into a separate group, including through a 'graduation' process, and are averse to the idea of taking on binding caps. Brazil refers to the need to "maintain the difference, both in intensity and legal nature, between the contributions of developed and developing countries." [ECOFYS, "Why the Durban outcome is not sufficient for staying below 2°C", 2012]</p>	<p><i>Bolivia outlined a proposed Protocol amendment, emphasizing that developed countries have "expropriated more than their fair share of the earth's environmental space." She called for strong efforts by developed countries to reduce their over-pollution and over-consumption. [...] Negotiations under the AWG-KP made little progress in 2009, with developing countries urging Annex 1 parties to commit to ambitious emission reduction targets in line with science and developed countries stressing that making progress on "numbers" and providing a meaningful response to climate change requires negotiations that also involve the US and major developing countries.</i></p>	<p><i>Parties' views diverged on the language contained in, and possible need for, a general framework, and the extent to which it should detail language on agriculture and bunker fuels. Discussions addressed how the application of common but differentiated responsibilities across sectors is both a "legal and a political issue," upon which guidance must be provided and must therefore be taken up by Ministers.</i></p>

International bunkers	Saudi Arabia is always keen to make trouble for this anti-carbon treaty, have claimed that addressing the issue of bunkers first requires other commitments (Depledge, 2008, "Striving for No" GEP)	<i>Parties invited to submit to the secretariat their views regarding the work programme on emissions from international aviation and maritime transport. So far they should be calculated as part of the national GHG inventories of Parties, but should be excluded from national totals and reported separately. These emissions are not subject to the limitation and reduction commitments of Annex I Parties under the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol. [...] The emissions from international aviation and maritime transport issue was first considered by the SBSTA plenary. Parties heard reports from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the International Maritime Organization (IMO). China and others stressed that actions in these sectors should be in line with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. The Bahamas supported that the IMO and ICAO remain the only bodies regulating emissions from international aviation and maritime transport. [...] Supported by Brazil, India opposed sectoral approaches, saying they could lead to benchmarking and, thus adversely affect developing countries' economic growth.</i>	<i>In Durban (South Africa, November/December 2011) international bunker fuels was negotiated under AWG-LCA agenda item 3.2.4 (Sectoral approaches) together with a general framework for sectoral approaches and agriculture. Parties agreed to include a text on this agenda item in the Outcome of the work of the AWG-LCA (p.14, paragraphs 74-78). For international aviation and maritime transport, the Conference of the Parties agreed to continue its consideration of issues related to addressing emissions from international aviation and maritime transport (p. 14, paragraph 78).</i>
Legally binding protocol	Copenhagen did not deliver an agreement with binding commitments to emissions cuts, and left the definition of objectives and their verification to future negotiations. (Beccherle and Tirole, 2011); a proposal by the United States and others that the intended outcome should be a legally-binding agreement was opposed by India and Saudi Arabia, among others, and was not included in the COP decision extending the AWG-LCA's mandate, so the legal form of the intended outcome in Mexico City remains open (Bodansky 2010, The Copenhagen climate change conference: a postmortem)	<i>Australia, for the Umbrella Group, called for bold action and a strong legally-binding outcome that provides clarity on rules for the flexibility mechanisms and for land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF). He stated that the negotiations under the Protocol provide a foundation for a single new legally-binding treaty.</i>	<i>Australia, for the Umbrella Group, supported a transition towards a climate change framework including all major economies, taking into account countries' respective capabilities. The European Union (EU) said Durban should address the gap in the level of ambition, a common international accounting system, and a process to deliver a new global comprehensive legally-binding framework to be completed by 2015.</i>
Carbon emissions trade affiliation (by 2nd period)	Although developing countries participated actively, the primary axis of the negotiations was the split among developed countries between the European Union and the United States – the EU pushing for strong emission reduction targets, implemented primarily through domestic measures, and the US (together with its "Umbrella Group" allies such as Australia and Japan) pushing for the unrestricted use of market-based mechanisms, including emissions trading. (Bodansky 2010, The Copenhagen climate change conference: a postmortem)	<i>On emissions trading, New Zealand noted interest in extending emissions trading to developing countries and proposed text reflecting this. This section retains the two options: one to take no decision with respect to this issue; and the other to enable all parties to participate in the trading of units from all market-based mechanisms. On new market-based mechanisms, the EU, opposed by Argentina and Venezuela, and supported by New Zealand and others, proposed a paragraph establishing new market-based mechanisms. Venezuela opposed the establishment of new market-based mechanisms and proposed inserting a footnote stating that this would require a Protocol amendment, and also noted that this issue is being addressed under the AWG-LCA. The two options remain on the table.</i>	<i>China, for the BASIC countries, said defining a second commitment period should be the main priority for Durban. He opposed "unilateral measures" on international aviation under the EU's Emissions Trading Scheme.</i>
Eligibility of REDD and sinks under CDM	Brazil and China have strongly emphasized the need for industrialized countries to make emission reduction commitments that are additional to any action on REDD. Indeed, China expresses determination that "the treatment of LULUCF should not lead to the creation of loopholes for Annex 1 Parties to achieve their emission reduction commitments by simply doing 'magic' paper work." Both countries insist that an agreement on REDD be only concluded after new industrialized country commitments have been hammered out. On the other hand, Korea has explicitly noted that "carbon credit for REDD+ could be a good example for crediting NAMAs. (Hoehne 2007, The rules for land use, land use change and forestry under the Kyoto Protocol: lessons learned for the future climate negotiations)	REDD: This issue (FCCC/SBSTA/2009/3 Annex I) was first considered by the SBSTA on 8 December and then referred to a contact group). In the opening plenary, which focused on a general exchange of views, many countries urged parties not to mix technical discussions under the SBSTA with policy-related discussions under the AWG-LCA. Many countries called for consideration of participation of indigenous peoples. Tanzania and Mali called for REDD methodologies to consider benefits for local communities. Papua New Guinea supported creation of an instrument that allows participation of countries that reduce their deforestation rates, protects existing forest or increases forest area. The Environmental Integrity Group recommended a decision allowing SBSTA to continue methodological work after the COP.	Papua New Guinea, for the Coalition of Rainforest Nations, supported an agreement on a second commitment period, the introduction of a REDD+ mechanism on a voluntary basis, and eliminating loopholes in the rules on LULUCF.

<p>Long-term limits (C degrees)</p>	<p>The Convention decision did not get an agreement on a year when global greenhouse gas emissions should peak or on a level of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2050, two issues which were discussed since 2007. The decision notes "with grave concern" the ambition gap towards the 2°C goal in 2020.</p> <p>It urges developed countries to increase their ambition level to "the range indicated in the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change". An encouragement to increase ambition is not included for developing countries. [ECOFYS, "Why the Durban outcome is not sufficient for staying below 2°C", 2012]</p>	<p><i>The 450ppm goal underlies South Africa's emissions scenario exercise (Government of South Africa 2008: 3), and was also suggested by Indonesia. The African group's negotiating text speaks of "at least halving global emissions relative to historical levels by mid-century, underpinned by ambitious mid-term targets." The Mexican national climate change strategy proposed a higher stable concentration of 550ppm, but this target is not among the options in the current UNFCCC negotiating text. Some countries, especially the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) have cautioned that the 450ppm goal would lead to excessively risky levels of warming, and have called for a much lower stabilization level of "well below 350ppm CO₂e." [...] Tillman Thomas, Prime Minister of Grenada, for AOSIS, called on all countries to work together to ensure that the Copenhagen outcomes fulfill the hopes and aspirations of millions of people "depending on us to do the right thing to help them stay alive." He stressed that all countries must take "strong measures" to achieve needed emission reductions to achieve the goal of limiting temperature increase to well below 1.5°C and atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations to below 350 ppm, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities</i></p>	<p><i>Parties' unilateral pledges will be converted to QELROs without reference to an overall global mitigation target, not to mention one that is evidence-based. This helps to explain some of the skepticism among environmental NGOs regarding the prospect for the ambitious effort required to stay within the global temperature range of 1.5 to 2.0 degrees Celsius.</i></p>
<p>Alternative framework to KP</p>	<p><i>One important area of discussion was the form of a possible legally binding agreed outcome from the AWGs—either in Cancun or subsequent years. A number of options were presented, including 1) a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol complemented by COP decisions on areas that are not covered within the treaty (technology, adaptation, etc), 2) a new, single legal instrument that would replace the KP to include its provisions and new areas, 3) two legal instruments, which are compatible but contain different issues. [UNDP Summary of August 2010 climate negotiations, p.1]</i></p>	<p><i>Sudan, for the G-77/China, stressed that the core mandate of the ongoing negotiations is to define ambitious quantified emission reduction targets for future commitment periods. He emphasized the "huge" gap between Annex I emission reduction pledges and what is required by science, and said negotiations should result in separate agreements under the AWG-KP and AWG-LCA. Grenada, for AOSIS, highlighted the Protocol as a central part of the climate change architecture and emphasized that its institutions must be reaffirmed and strengthened through ambitious emission reduction targets for the second and subsequent commitment periods, consistent with the science. Lesotho, for the LDCs, said the Protocol is the only instrument in place to harmonize efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and stressed that the AWG-KP should be "steered away from" the AWG-LCA to maintain the distinction between the two tracks. Switzerland, for the Environmental Integrity Group, called for a follow-up agreement to the Protocol in order for industrialized countries to continue, and to intensify, their emission reduction commitments. He called on all Annex I countries to take the lead in achieving the 2°C objective.</i></p>	<p><i>The Gambia, for LDCs, called for a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol [...] Saudi Arabia, for the Arab Group, rejected attempts to marginalize the Kyoto Protocol.</i></p>
<p>REDD recording</p>	<p>One possible model that has been aired in discussions is to establish a global forest conservation fund along the lines of the Global Environmental Facility (GEF), managed jointly by the UNDP, UNEP and the World Bank. But, many are sceptical to the record of GEF in dealing with REDD recording and are afraid of creating (yet) another large international scheme [of emission tracking]. (Levin, McDermott and Cashore, 2008)</p>	<p><i>Papua New Guinea agreed with the focus on Protocol Article 3.9, but supported by others, called for also considering forest issues and REDD.</i></p>	<p><i>The Secretariat presented a proposal for a draft decision on modalities and procedures for small-scale A&R CDM, and on measures to facilitate their implementation. JAPAN, supported by CANADA, said simplified modalities and procedures are necessary to reduce transaction costs, and the EU said simplified modalities and procedures should avoid overestimating carbon credits or compromising the Protocol's environmental integrity. URUGUAY stressed the importance of synergies with other conventions.</i></p>

Reduction of overall GHG in long term (>2012)	<p>The United States, for instance, suggests in its recent negotiating text that "developing-country Parties whose national circumstances reflect greater responsibility or capability," should submit NAMAs "in the 2020/[] timeframe that are quantified (e.g., reduction from business-as-usual)," as well as, crucially, specify a date by which developing country Parties will take on binding quantitative commitments equivalent in nature to those made by developed countries [Bodansky, <i>The Durban Platform Negotiation: Outcomes and Options</i>, 2012]</p>	<p>On emission reductions, SAUDI ARABIA opposed by ARGENTINA, AOSIS, the EU and MAURITIUS said that targets for the second commitment period should be limited to Annex B Parties, and should not include developing country Parties.</p>	<p>The Gambia, for LDCs, called [...] on Annex I parties to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions by at least 45% below 1990 levels by 2020 and at least 95% below 1990 levels by 2050.</p>
Mitigation projects (money)	<p>Other [funding groups], such as mitigation, only accomplished a single read-through of the text [UNDP <i>Summary of August 2010 climate negotiations</i>, p.1]</p>	<p>Countries' positions on finance and mitigation, however, remained entrenched. Many also characterized questions concerning the legal structure of the mitigation framework as a cloud hanging over the negotiations.</p>	<p>TANZANIA, for the LDCs, expressed concern at the slow disbursement of funds for the preparation of national adaptation programmes of action (NAPA). EGYPT stressed the need to promote mitigation funding, technology transfer and CDM activities.</p>
ODA support (IO collaboration)	<p>Funding for adaptation is the responsibility of high-income, high-emitting countries, to be paid to countries most vulnerable to the impacts of those emissions. It is therefore relevant for the negotiations to distinguish between funding for building resilience to climate change (which is additional to ODA contributions) versus that for building resilience to climate variability more generally (which could be included in ODA contributions). This UNFCCC approach is supported by many developing countries in order to prevent industrialized countries incorporating adaptation funding into development assistance. (Ayers and Huq, 2009, Supporting adaptation to climate change: what role for official development assistance?)</p>	<p>Uruguay, Senegal and Jamaica called on the international community to provide more financial support to the Fund. Afghanistan stressed that adaptation funding must be additional to, and separate from, official development assistance (ODA). Mauritania urged simplification of procedures to access funding in order to ensure eligible countries can benefit.</p>	<p>The US opposed singling out specific organizations. The G-77/China stressed the need to ensure the provision of long-term support for the process. During the closing plenary on Sunday morning,</p>
Technology transfer	<p>Understanding how these technologies might be transferred to developing countries is an urgent priority. This urgency is reflected in the prominence of technology transfer within contemporary international climate negotiations. (Ockwell et al 2008, Key policy considerations for facilitating low carbon technology transfer to developing countries)</p>	<p>Parties had agreed on the establishment of a technology mechanism with a technology executive committee and a climate technology center. He said discussions had focused on the functions of these entities and agreement had been reached with some "minor issues" outstanding.</p>	<p>The G-77/China urged defining the governance structure of the Technology Mechanism. Bolivia stressed the need for discussing intellectual property rights in the context of the TEC. Parties focused on: possible gaps in the overall call for proposals and selection process to host the Climate Technology Center and Network (CTCN), including financial arrangements and eligibility criteria; and possible gaps in evaluation criteria and information requirements.</p>

Voluntary vs stringent measure requirements	<p>While Durban provided some silver linings for Small and Medium Enterprises some developed countries (e.g. Switzerland) drew attention to the detrimental effects of home-made regulatory issues (FDI regulations, IPR, etc) in countries that could profit from Durban [Henrique Schneider, SME perspectives on Durban, 2012]</p>	<p><i>The operative text states that non-Annex I parties to the Convention will implement mitigation actions, including those to be submitted to the Secretariat in the format given in Appendix II by 31 January 2010, for compilation in an INF document. LDCs and SIDS may undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support.</i></p>	<p><i>Some parties supported that appropriate market-based approaches be developed and that the SBSTA could develop modalities and procedures. Some other developing country parties considered that results-based finance provided to developing countries may come from a wide variety of sources, including alternative sources, considering appropriate market and non-market based approaches under the Convention. [...] An ALBA country strongly supported developing non-market based approaches focusing on the multiple functions and values of forests. [...]</i></p>
International accountability	<p>The Convention provides that the Conference of the Parties adopt conciliation procedures as soon as practicable; this has not yet occurred. Perhaps if these conciliation procedures materialize, it may prove a viable option for [countries like] Tuvalu. While proceedings before the conciliation commission would have a much lower profile than those before the ICJ, and its determination would not be binding, a conciliation case might be able to help establish that the United States is not complying with its obligations under the UNFCCC. (Mainprize, J. 2008, The World is Sinking)</p>	<p><i>On commitment periods, parties exchanged views on the pros and cons of a five-year versus an eight-year commitment period. Considerations included: domestic constraints related to legislation and ratification processes; and ability to respond to science, including a possible mid-term review for an eight-year cycle. No agreement was reached and both options were retained in the text.</i></p>	<p><i>On accounting, Australia supported a common accounting framework for all parties. The EU said common accounting rules are key to increasing ambition and ensuring transparency. The US said the development of such rules was not mandated by the Cancun Agreements and suggested they be based on IPCC methodologies. [...] On International Assessment and Review, Bolivia called for a compliance system and a set of penalties. Mali, for the African Group, suggested a robust compliance mechanism.</i></p>
Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS)	<p>the publication of the IPCC Special Report on Carbon dioxide Capture and Storage, CCS was included as a UNFCCC negotiation topic under the Clean Development Mechanism. OPEC countries, not least through vocal Saudi Arabia, are strong advocates of CCS technology in the UNFCCC negotiations (de Coninck and Bäckstrand, 2011, An International Relations perspective on the global politics of carbon dioxide capture and storage)</p>	<p><i>Parties then considered the text and identified issues in the text that could be referred to the COP/MOP for further consideration, including: CCS under the CDM; nuclear activities under the CDM; and standardized baselines. Parties then focused on streamlining and removing brackets from the various options on the other items in the text.</i></p>	<p><i>One developing country speaker proposed a reference to funding for carbon capture and storage (CCS), but this was opposed by another delegate. An Annex I party noted duplication of text and suggested consolidating them.</i></p>
Adaptation projects (money)	<p>Some funding groups, such adaptation, were able to dive deeper into issues on a possible Adaptation Committee under the Convention [UNDP Summary of August 2010 climate negotiations, p.1]; Parties do recognise the need to begin implementation and putting in place at least some interim structures that can later feed into the negotiations. In particular, LDC countries emphasised in Bonn the importance of showing results on the ground as soon as possible to give momentum and lessons learned to the negotiations process [Hale, "The new politics of CC", 2010, p. 264]</p>	<p><i>The G-77/China said the fourth review provides an opportunity to look at gaps in implementation of obligations in a comprehensive manner. The LDCs expressed dissatisfaction with implementation of the LDC work programme, stressing that funding should not be restricted to NAPAs. China said developed countries must significantly increase their contributions to the fifth replenishment and reform the GEF to improve its capacity to facilitate implementation post-2012.</i></p> <p><i>The EU welcomed review and guidance ahead of the conclusion of the fifth replenishment, noting the review should provide the basis for progressively defining the role of the GEF in the architecture being defined under the AWG-LCA.</i></p>	<p><i>Spain addressed the work of the Adaptation Fund, indicating that institutional progress has been overshadowed by falling prices of CERs. Bahamas, for the G-77/China, stressed the comparatively small amount of money made available for adaptation. Several others said the accreditation process should be simplified to facilitate access.</i></p>

Supplementarity of mechanisms	Domestic policy choices in developed countries could also influence the role of [sectoral or NAMA-based market] mechanisms. While the use of credits is now a common element in the climate policy packages of developed countries, some domestically-driven restrictions are likely to apply to the use of credits post 2012 – while some developing countries insist on the principle of supplementarity, which would restrict the use of credits by developed countries. (Aasrud 2009, Sectoral Market Mechanisms–Issues for Negotiation and Domestic Implementation)	<i>On supplementarity of the flexibility mechanisms, Peru proposed including a section on this issue in the text, limiting the amounts that can be added to, or subtracted from, the Assigned Amounts of a party through the flexibility mechanisms. Brazil, supported by Peru and opposed by Japan and Saudi Arabia, proposed specifying a cap of 30% on the use of the flexibility mechanisms. The EU, supported by Norway, proposed having an option stating that no decision should be taken on this issue. Grenada, for AOSIS, proposed inserting a preamble recognizing that developed countries shall achieve their QELROs primarily through domestic efforts. Australia, supported by Canada, proposed moving this preamble to the operative part of the text and then inserting an option maintaining the status quo. AOSIS, Jamaica, Peru and Brazil, opposed by Norway and Saudi Arabia, supported retaining the text in the preamble. New Zealand proposed inserting alternative language in the preamble, recalling the definition of supplementarity in decision 2/CMP.1 (principles, nature and scope of the flexibility mechanisms).</i>	<i>The decision (FCCC/AWG/2011/L.3/Add.3) reconfirms that the use of the mechanisms shall be supplemental to domestic action; decides to review at CMP 8, and revise as appropriate, the design of the commitment period reserve for the subsequent commitment period to support the effective operation of emissions trading; and requests SBI 36 to consider the issue.</i>
Accreditation of nuclear energy	Country stakes in climate change negotiations include issues of permanent storage of nuclear waste and potential proliferation of nuclear material for weapons manufacture (Buys et al, 2009, Country stakes in climate change negotiations: Two dimensions of vulnerability)	<i>Parties then considered the text and identified issues in the text that could be referred to the COP/MOP for further consideration, including: CCS under the CDM; nuclear activities under the CDM; and standardized baselines. Parties then focused on streamlining and removing brackets from the various options on the other items in the text.</i>	<i>Noted that the implementation of the safeguards referred to in Appendix I to Decision 1/CP.16, and information on how these safeguards are being addressed and respected, should support national strategies or action plans and be included in, where appropriate, all phases of implementation.</i>
Accreditation of small offset projects	The Kyoto Protocol's Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) has had relatively little success in Africa due to a number of factors. Small-scale systems with net emission reductions may hold a key for Africa to engage with the international offset mechanisms and open the door to soil carbon sequestration projects. Whitman and Lehmann, 2009, Biochar—One way forward for soil carbon in offset mechanisms in Africa?)	<i>Grenada and Brazil opposed the proposal for a full-time chair, noting the existence of a full-time Secretariat and highlighting that the proposal would only favor those countries that can support a full-time chair. Grenada also objected to adopting terms of reference for CDM EB members, highlighting that it may bias countries with limited CDM knowledge and expertise. Ethiopia, for the LDCs, proposed exempting small-scale projects in LDCs from the additionality requirement.</i>	<i>Disagreement emerged around a proposal by some developing countries to include a footnote explaining that "appropriate" means exclusion of offsetting mechanisms and/or carbon markets.</i>
Engagement under CDM/JI	The aforementioned limits to project-level activities has led to proposals to expand the CDM to include credit for programs of bundled activities, policy reforms, and even sectoral targets. Because efforts to provide these credits are sufficiently large to require idiosyncratic negotiations, they also create an opportunity and incentive for domestic policy reform. (Hall et al, 2008, Policies for Developing Country Engagement)	<i>Japan, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, the United Arab Emirates, Syria, Nigeria, Libya and others, opposed by Grenada and Tuvalu, stressed the importance of including CCS under the CDM.</i>	<i>After consultations, compromise had been reached on carbon capture and storage (CCS) in the CDM, while project-specific reserve and transboundary issues were referred to SBSTA. [...] In its decision (FCCC/SBSTA/2011/L.4), the CMP of CDM adopts the modalities and procedures for CCS as CDM project activities, to be reviewed no later than five years after the adoption of this decision; and agrees to consider at CMP 8 the eligibility of CCS involving the transport of carbon dioxide from one country to another or which involves geological storage sites that are located in more than one country.</i>

<p>Action plan status</p>	<p>Several major developing countries have raised concerns over national legislative proposals that contemplate climate change-motivated trade measures without [first] implementing climate-specific legislation (Kulovesi and Gutiérrez, 2009, Climate Change Negotiations Update: Process and Prospects for a Copenhagen Agreed Outcome in December 2009)</p>	<p><i>The SBSTA [...] welcomes progress on and work under the NWP (Nairobi Work Programme on Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation) and the direct engagement and contributions, including through action pledges, of many organizations in its implementation</i></p>	<p><i>On ambition, Switzerland, for the EIG, suggested a process to increase ambition, technical workshops, and further consideration at COP 18. The US said the Cancun Agreements do not establish a process for narrowing the ambition gap and this should be considered in the context of the 2013-2015 Review. New Zealand, supported by Australia and Norway, proposed a template as a flexible tool to capture information on pledges, including on sectors, metrics, gases and timeframes covered. Parties discussed whether or not to clarify pledges, assumptions and conditions, with several saying it was useful to do so. Guidance was sought from Ministers on clarification of pledges and whether they should be translated into other forms. [...]</i></p>
<p>Systematic observation</p>	<p>There is dissent around whether MRV would be carried out by national authorities or an international body, and whether according to national or internationally agreed standards. Most developing countries argue that different regimes should apply to actions that receive international support and those that do not, and it seems likely that compromise might be possible along those lines.</p>	<p><i>Australia, for the Umbrella Group, underscored the importance of MRV. [...] The US, Australia, Canada and others supported international MRV of NAMAs. Many developing countries stressed this should be conducted at the domestic level.</i></p>	<p><i>The agenda item relating to MRV remained in abeyance. Proposed new items related to the impacts of the implementation of response measures also featured prominently.[...] On reporting, monitoring and evaluation, delegates discussed using national communications as the primary tool for communicating progress and whether the Secretariat should establish a database, with some developed countries expressing concern over costs, and some developing countries specifying such a database should be on support provided, not on activities.</i></p>

3: Coding scheme (period 1)

<p>Accreditation of (small) offset and mitigation</p>	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the criteria to assign emission reduction credit to small (<50 MWatt) offsetting projects. As the criteria can be not-yet fixed, nationally fixed, or internationally fixed, the position reflects the preferred type of standardization of RES and small-scale energy efficiency programmes.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for accrediting small-scale projects on the basis of case-by-case assessment/non-diffused/non-centralized methodology (not-yet-enforced national scheme)/pilot projects/general introductory programs/experimentally; 2 for supporting and framing (or wanting to frame) small-scale projects within a national body or based on national scheme (i.e. official national programs); 3 for accrediting small-scale projects in reference to international criteria, e.g. IPCC, EU, SBSTA, World Bank, or via regional/transnational programs (e.g. US Country Study Program, or AIJ), or via an international market.</p>
<p>Accreditation of nuclear energy</p>	<p>Ordinal variable (1-4 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the use of nuclear energy within the context of climate change policy and emission reduction.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for acknowledging emission reduction with the use of nuclear energy (safe nuclear argument); 2 for expressing an interest to limit nuclear energy, or encouraging emission reduction from nuclear energy with some specifications, and/or stating that the debate on whether to use it or not is still on; 3 for calling to limit emission reductions from nuclear energy or announcing a phase-out/withdrawal; 4 for requesting to forbid emission reductions from nuclear energy generation unless internationally regulated.</p>
<p>Action plan/institutional status</p>	<p>Ordinal variables (1-3 values)</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the level of due action and the enhancement of the institutionalization of policies that reduce GHG. This position stands thereby for performance level and assessment of implementation (Wang and Wieser 2002).</p> <p>Here is an estimator of countries' engagement in adopting laws and acts that address climate management in the different emission-producing sectors and that reflects legislative engagement specifically on climate change (i.e. NO general environmental legislation, but YES for financial budget bills or industrial laws that have to do with mitigation and adaptation) in recent years (1994-2004). This issue centers on the debate over art. 2 and 4 of the KP on the legal responsibilities of Annex I and non-Annex I parties respectively.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for supporting the introduction but not yet enforcement of a legislation, an executive decree, or a plan with penalizing mechanisms ["plans to", "hopes to"]; 2 for possessing a piece of climate management legislation and provisioning its constitutional legitimacy, but not yet imposing penalties for non-compliance or not proposing imminent enforcement [this refers to a resolution just passed or changed; language as "seeking to promote", "supports", "foresees"]; 3 for supporting the enforcement of compliance with a passed and enforced law where punishment mechanisms are in place, executed and evaluated [this includes language such as "calling to", "requiring", "enforces"].</p> <p>1 [Announcement/Introduction] < 2 [Promulgation/Proclamation/New implementation] < 3 [Full Enforcement/Penalties Application/Execution]</p>

Adaptation support (projects)	<p>Continuous variable (value of adaptation-oriented finance)</p> <p>This variable captures the willingness to invest/receive money in form of specific adaptation-relevant projects. For Annex I countries this entails internal investments and investments in developing countries; by contrast, for non-Annex I countries this entails internal investments and receipts from other countries or multilateral funds. Such values may include adaptation-specific GEF funds. In case of a range of projected costs, the most conservative (i.e. lowest) value is taken.</p> <p>"Adaptation projects" include efficiency-related improvements, equity access to natural resources and resource access improvement, and infrastructure/buildings and transportation investments.</p> <p>Note 1: If the value of the cost of the project is in a different rate than the USD, register as such (it is to be converted later).</p> <p>Note 2: If the project is funded through an international-national partnership, count only the national part of the funding. If the project is funded by an international organization only, count the full cost as this money was assigned to the country. If the project is funded by a non-public international organization or the private sector only, do NOT count the costs.</p>
Assignment of ERUs/AAUs for 1st period	<p>Ordinal variable (1-4 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the conditions for accepting the generation and exchange of international emission reduction credits (ERUs, AAUs, or CERs) - see Art. 6, 12 and 17 in KP.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for not considering/not facilitating emission credits allocation - regardless of estimated reserves; 2 for planning/proposing to facilitate emission credits allocations as of/after 2008 with the condition that the reserves "should" not fall below the required level, or allowances "should" (not) be issued before 2008, or the allocation should start with a pilot scheme; 3 for planning to facilitate emission credits allocations before 2008 given the current level of reserves (i.e. without addressing the long-term integrity of reserves); 4 for allocating emission credits before the first commitment period given the integrity of reserves and specific targets.</p>
Funds support/approach	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the format of financial support preferred to support climate management in least developed and developing countries</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for supporting finances subject to or drawn from bilateral relations (i.e. bilateral specification, project-specific funds); 2 for supporting finances that are drawn from multilateral funds (these can be in a combination of UN agencies, several regional programmes, etc); 3 for supporting finances that are drawn from an independently financed developing countries-fund (IFC or GEF) with a special status.</p>

CDM/JI participation criteria	<p>Categorical variables (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the requirements to meet in order to be allowed in the participation of CDM/JI (Art. 6 and 12 in KP).</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for granting participation to all Kyoto Protocol (KP) signers from the Annex I group and all non-Annex I countries; 2 for granting participation to all KP signers from Annex I group conditional on their reserves and all non-Annex I countries with a JI/CDM board or office; 3 all KP signers from Annex I group conditional on their reserves and eligible non-Annex I countries.</p>
Differentiated responsibilities	<p>Binary variable (0-1 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on whether to exclude or include the concept of "common but differentiated responsibilities" (see Art. 10 of KP).</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>0 for leaving the Convention text as it is, i.e. accounting for "common but differentiated responsibilities" [also, argument of "low per capita" emissions and inter-generational responsibility]; 1 for changing the Convention text to, e.g. common (equal) responsibilities.</p>
Eligibility of LULUCF sinks under KP/CDM	<p>Ordinal variable (1-4 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on how much the LULUCF sector could account for the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms (CDM) under Art. 12. As this can only be proxied with how much a player believes the stock of managed lands and forests should be englobed in the CDM (or eventually the JI), it is estimated as the quantity of LULUCF-generated/reduced emissions.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for LULUCF sinks (e.g. avoided deforestation) to be reducing overall 3% of total emission or below [this corresponds to language that conveys no interest in pursuing *extra* international projects]; 2 for LULUCF sinks to be reducing between 3% and 5% of total emissions [this corresponds to language that conveys the interest in "doubling" the cap of international LULUCF sinks]; for LULUCF sinks to be reducing between 5% and 7% of total emissions [this corresponds to language that conveys the interest in "tripling" the cap of international LULUCF sinks]; for LULUCF sinks to be reducing between 5% and 7% of total emissions from 7% above of total emission reductions [this corresponds to language that conveys the interest in re-discussing the cap of international LULUCF sinks].</p>
Emissions trade affiliation by 1st period	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the creation of a trading scheme for emission credits. It estimates when and on what conditions a country would want to implement such trading scheme as encouraged by the Kyoto Protocol mechanism in art. 17.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for ignoring/not discussing a trading scheme implementation or (for Annex I countries) postponing the creation of such market for after 2008; 2 for supporting a scheme to take place as of 2008, or (for Annex I countries) discussing a scheme to implemented eventually in the long-term/after 2008; 3 for implementing a carbon emission trading scheme before 2008 (i.e. before the first commitment period).</p>

Industry proportional impact	<p>Binary variable (0-1 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on whether to ignore or include the emission generation of small polluting units in single projects (agriculture production, manufacture, chemistry, and generally firms up to 30MW of energy capacity) into the inventory. This is also known as the position on the principle of proportional impact focusing on the methodological details proposed in art. 9 and 10 of the KP.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>0 for ignoring from the official inventory computation the impact of such small entities that add up to a max of 5% of total CO2 emission in one year (dismissing or discounting them with the principle of proportional impact); 1 for accounting for any impact from small industries (or planning to include them in the future, hence benefiting from special provisions regarding the principle of proportional impact).</p>
Intl Accountability and responsibility	<p>Ordinal variable (1-4 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the level of international vs. domestic responsibility and accountability that the UNFCCC should qualify itself with. International accountability entails a reliance to international research and institutional monitoring, while the domestic accountability entails a nationally-oriented perception of responsibilities.</p> <p>Note: The signature of international environmental conventions including the Kyoto Protocol is irrelevant, as all countries submitting the reports have signed them. Do not code information on the signature, but do code information on ratification status.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for refraining international accountability and making nations only accountable for climate change responsibility - this position suits countries that work only in defence of national interest and do not believe in the watchdog role of international institutions;</p> <p>2 for supporting international accountability at the condition of prioritizing national circumstances ('special conditions') and making international accountability secondary to national responsibility (stress on national sovereignty);</p> <p>3 for supporting international accountability and letting domestic institutions step aside, implement or fill the gaps (i.e. preference for moderate international accountability/ interest in a national role in the international setup, hence a comparability between the national and the international schemes) - this position is revealed by the use of words such as "endorsement";</p> <p>4 for proposing and supporting 'uber alles' international accountability (and therefore being subject to international law) without constraints - this position corresponds to countries that perceive only the instruments in defence of international interests (international inspections, a punishment mechanism), and is often denoted by words such as "international transparency" and "institutional implementation".</p>

Legally binding intl treaty	<p>Ordinal variable (1-4 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the state of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol in terms of binding international law (see Art. 20 of the KP on the rules of agreement and acceptance).</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for preferring no legally binding protocol in the present nor in the (short-term) future, wanting the Convention to be unbinding, even if ratified; 2 for wanting a binding protocol enforceable at conditions to be discussed in the future but keeping it unbinding for the short-term (this may entail reshuffling Annexes and making new binding commitments for the future); 3 for preferring a binding protocol enforceable in the future (i.e. waiting for Kyoto to start, and then having signatories bound and rules increasingly strengthened); 4 for claiming an enforced protocol right away in the present, where all bound according to the current rules.</p>
Technology transfer (link to intl assistance)	<p>Ordinal variables (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the introduction of technology transfers in the international assistance channels to developing countries (see Art. 2.3 of KP).</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for supporting the provision to developing countries of funds that secondarily/indirectly link to technological transfers (e.g. funds with first priority in poverty reduction or "sustainable development"); 2 for supporting the provision of structured funds that include among other goals the technological transfer, OR proposing a gradual or condition introduction of technologies without transfer in the side line; 3 for supporting developing countries with funds that have a strict focus on technology transfer.</p>
LULUCF emission projected reductions	<p>Continuous variable (percentage)</p> <p>This variable captures the level of assurance from the reduction from LULUCF-related activities - given the proposed additional activities/measures (inclusive of biomass regeneration, if included). It estimates the projected reduction that a country believes reasonable from the most uncertain sector of emission reduction if targeted mitigation is applied.</p> <p>Note 1: more optimistic rates should reflect a position that favours historic levels of (de)forestation, while more conservative rates should reflect a preference for projected emissions based on reference levels.</p> <p>Note 2: This number is found under the projected emission scenario with measures (so this is NOT the baseline scenario). If the number is in Gg or in tons, it is standardized by dividing it to the total amount of projected emissions.</p>

LULUCF sinks accounting	<p>Binary variable (0-1 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on whether or not to account certain non-manageable activities in the LULUCF national inventories (e.g. grazing land, cropland, natural reforestation). Therefore, this reflects whether a country prefers to be conservative to the categorization of LUCF activities (following the Kyoto Protocol article 3.1-4) or rather wants to add up the carbon impact of more controversial (non-managed) LULUCF activities. This debate is also called the "logging loophole", where some countries have claimed the freedom to pick and choose which LUCF activities to include in their inventories.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>0 for not accounting for non-managed LULUCF activities in the national inventories (i.e. not adding their carbon impact into the total of the inventory, or having them in a separate category); 1 for adding or subtracting non-managed LULUCF activities to the final figures.</p>
<p>Mitigation emphasis (projects)</p> <p>***ratio with "Adaptation emphasis"***</p>	<p>Continuous variable (value of the costs of mitigation-orientated project)</p> <p>This variable captures the willingness to invest/receive money in forms of mitigation-relevant projects. For Annex I countries this entails internal investments and investments in developing countries, while for non-Annex I countries this entails internal investments and receipts from other countries or multilateral funds (it may include mitigation-specific GEF funds).</p> <p>Capacity building may be considered part of this category when it implies foreign investment in abatement lessons and technology transfers (e.g. application of new technologies and industry's energy efficiency), but also the development of communications and reports to the UNFCCC as well as money to strengthening information gathering. Mitigation projects include industrial technology upgrading, performing implementation tasks, introducing new energy extraction techniques, etc.</p> <p>Note 1: If the value of the cost of the project is in a different rate than the USD, register as such (it is to be converted later).</p> <p>Note 2: If the project is funded through an international-national partnership, count only the national part of the funding. If the project is funded by an international organization only, count the full cost as this money was assigned to the country. If the project is funded by a non-public international organization or the private sector only, do NOT count the costs.</p>
ODA support (IO collaboration)	<p>Binary variable (0-1 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the financial additionality of climate change funds, i.e. whether to link (or divert) international development assistance money (ODA/IDA) to climate change aid or whether to keep them separate (debate over Art. 11.2b of KP).</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>0 for not linking UNFCCC-specific funding for climate change directly to international assistance (i.e. keeping the funds destined for ODA separate to specific climate projects); 1 for linking (diverting, integrating) funds destined in ODA.</p>

Reduction of GHG in (2020 target)	<p>Continuous variable (percentage)</p> <p>This variable captures the commitment to reduce emissions in the future (~2005-10) compared to 1990 levels. This shows which countries agree to cap GHG emission at 1990 levels and which agree to reduce *below* the 1990 levels, and also which countries agree to reduce though they are not required and which refuse even if required.</p> <p>This data is used to compare the decision of the aggregate global reduction target versus the preferred targets as conveyed by the single positions.</p>
Supplementarity	<p>Binary variable (0-1 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the option of linking use of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms and other UNFCCC resources to the principle of domestic action supplementarity (Art. 7 of the KP).</p> <p>The values are:</p> <p>0 for allowing UNFCCC mechanisms/benefits not to be conditional on domestic action (non-Annex I countries shall not be bound to supplementarity and Annex I countries shall have no direct obligations); 1 for linking UNFCCC mechanisms and benefits to domestic action for all Parties: an Annex I country shall meet a certain level of domestic action requirement, and a non-Annex I country shall assign itself the duty to work on climate change with its own domestic resources first, and then subsequently draw from the UNFCCC instruments.</p>
Systematic observation implementation	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the minimum level of measurement and verification preferred by each Party in climate change policy. This position must be proxied here with the status of measurement and how the country portrays present and future action to implement observations -- it is assumed that all countries submitting the national reports are interested in conducting some level of climate change observation (Art. 4 and 5 of the Convention).</p> <p>Note: This issue does *not* capture positions on the vulnerability or the data for the Inventory.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for favouring some reporting (or planning to report) but no systematic rules in place because of some challenge (e.g. disagreement with IPCC); "voluntary" monitoring/reporting;</p> <p>2 for reporting and accounting for carbon stocks in some form of scheme with some details but no holistic frame and/or no strict monitoring schedule ["temporary"/short-term monitoring]; yes for planning to report more in depth in the future + retrieve more data;</p> <p>3 for reporting and accounting for carbon stock changes according to a strict system of rules ["permanent" monitoring].</p>

<p>Uncertainty of measures</p>	<p>Binary variable (0-1 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the (un)certainty of emission reduction effect of the measures implied by articles 2.3, 3 and 4.8 of the Kyoto Protocol.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>0 for noting/stressing the riskiness or uncertain benefits of abatement measures (skepticism towards the IPCC's Manual for Good Practice); 1 for noting/arguing for the benefits of the KP measures (No regrets policy; Reliance on and trust of current scientific assesment and/or precautionary action / little degree of riskiness in the measures)</p>
<p>Voluntary vs. stringent/obligatory measures</p>	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the role that the national government should play towards firms and industries, and therefore the type of relation (and requirements) that the government should provide to the private sector (this issue is part of the discussion on Art. 5 of the KP on national reporting systems).</p> <p>Note 1: such 'requirements' go from imposing reporting duties and regulative action to formulating programmes and agreements in coordination with the private sector and firms (do NOT include industrial laws or acts)</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for pursuing voluntary/lenient/liberally supportive programmes [i.e. private sectors' loans and grants, end-consumer prices, industrial credits, voluntary certificates, etc]; 2 for pursuing semi-voluntary programmes/partial tax/flexible tax requirements/joint action [i.e. labelling; agreements/moderate limitations/complementarity; demand-side management; gradual regulation; statement of mutual understanding; tax incentives]; 3 for pursuing stringent and unconditional requirements ["producer responsibility"; market discipline; bye-laws; regulatory subsidy; a top-down tax - unless noted otherwise, is "stringent and obligatory"].</p>

4: Coding scheme (period 2)

Accreditation of (small) offset and mitigation	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the criteria to assign emission reduction credit to small (<50 MWatt) offsetting projects. As the criteria can be not-yet fixed, nationally fixed, or internationally fixed, the position reflects the preferred type of standardization of RES and small-scale energy efficiency programmes.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for accrediting small-scale projects on the basis of case-by-case assessment/non-diffused/non-centralized methodology (not-yet-enforced national scheme)/pilot projects/general introductory programs/experimentally; 2 for supporting and framing (or wanting to frame) small-scale projects within a national body or based on national scheme (i.e. official national programs); 3 for accrediting small-scale projects in reference to international criteria, e.g. IPCC, EU, SBSTA, World Bank, or via regional/transnational programs (e.g. IRENA, or AIJ), or via an international market.</p>
Accreditation of CCS	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the use of carbon capture and storage (CCS) energy projects (no forestry, no natural sinks, yes marine sinks, geological storage) within the context of climate change policy and emission reduction and specifically CDM.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for acknowledging emission reduction with the use of CCS (safe argument); 2 for expressing an interest to try CCS and encouraging emission reduction from CCs with some specifications, and/or stating that the debate on when it is safe to use it or not; 3 for calling to limit emission reductions for CCS or unless piloted.</p>
Accreditation of nuclear energy	<p>Ordinal variable (1-4 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the use of nuclear energy within the context of climate change policy and emission reduction.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for acknowledging emission reduction with the use of nuclear energy (safe nuclear argument); 2 for expressing an interest to limit nuclear energy, or encouraging emission reduction from nuclear energy with some specifications, and/or stating that the debate on whether to use it or not is still on; 3 for calling to limit emission reductions from nuclear energy or announcing a phase-out/withdrawal; 4 for requesting to internationally regulate all kinds of emission reductions from nuclear energy generation.</p>

Action plan/institutional status	<p>Ordinal variables (1-3 values)</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the level of due action and the enhancement of the institutionalization of policies that reduce GHG. This position stands thereby for performance level and assessment of implementation (Wang and Wieser 2002).</p> <p>Here is an estimator of countries' engagement in adopting laws and acts that address climate management in the different emission-producing sectors and that reflects legislative engagement specifically on climate change (i.e. NO general environmental legislation, but YES for financial budget bills or industrial laws that have to do with mitigation and adaptation) in recent years (1994-2004). This issue centers on the debate over art. 2 and 4 of the KP on the legal responsibilities of Annex I and non-Annex I parties respectively.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for supporting the introduction but not yet enforcement of a legislation, an executive decree, or a plan with penalizing mechanisms ["plans to", "hopes to"]; 3 for possessing a piece of climate management legislation and provisioning its constitutional legitimacy, but not yet imposing penalties for non-compliance or not proposing imminent enforcement [this refers to a resolution just passed or changed; language as "seeking to promote", "supports", "forsees"]; 4 for supporting the enforcement of compliance with a passed and enforced law where punishment mechanisms are in place, executed and evaluated [this includes language such as "calling to", "requiring", "enforces"].</p> <p>1 [Announcement/Introduction] < 2 [Promulgation/Proclamation/New implementation] < 3 [Full Enforcement/Penalties Application/Execution]</p>
Adaptation support (projects)	<p>Continuous variable (value of adaptation-oriented finance)</p> <p>This variable captures the willingness to invest/receive money in form of specific adaptation-relevant projects. For Annex I countries this entails internal investments and investments in developing countries; by contrast, for non-Annex I countries this entails internal investments and receipts from other countries or multilateral funds. Such values may include adaptation-specific GEF funds. In case of a range of projected costs, the most conservative (i.e. lowest) value is taken.</p> <p>"Adaptation projects" include efficiency-related improvements, equity access to natural resources and resource access improvement, and infrastructure/buildings and transportation investments.</p> <p>Note 1: If the value of the cost of the project is in a different rate than the USD, register as such (it is converted later).</p> <p>Note 2: If the project is funded through an international-national partnership, count only the national part of the funding. If the project is funded by an international organization only, count the full cost as this money was assigned to the country. If the project is funded by a non-public international organization or the private sector only, do NOT count the costs.</p>

Alternative to KP regime	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on a possible new legal agreement from the Ad Hoc Working Groups.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for a new, single legal instrument that would integrate the KP and include its provisions; 2 for a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol complemented by COP decisions on areas that are not covered within the treaty, and 3 for two legal instruments, which are compatible and reinforce each other.</p>
Assignment of ERUs/AAUs for 2nd period	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the conditions for accepting the generation and exchange of international emission reduction credits (ERUs, AAUs, or CERs) - see Art. 6, 12 and 17 in KP.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for planning/proposing to facilitate emission credits allocations without the condition that the reserves should not fall below the required level, or the allocation should start with a pilot scheme; 2 for planning to facilitate emission credits allocations given the current level of reserves (i.e. without addressing the long-term integrity of reserves) but NO PAM/NAMA/NAP programs' accreditation; 3 for allocating emission credits given the integrity of reserves and specific targets plus the creation of PAM/NAMA/NAP's tradable credits.</p>
Funds support/approach	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the format of financial support preferred to support climate management in least developed and developing countries.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for supporting finances subject to or drawn from bilateral relations (i.e. bilateral specification, project-specific funds); 2 for supporting finances that are drawn from multilateral funds (these can be in a combination of UN agencies, several regional programmes, etc); 3 for supporting finances that are drawn from an independently financed developing countries-fund (IFC or GEF) with a special status.</p>
CDM/JI participation criteria	<p>Categorical variables (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the requirements to meet in order to be allowed in the participation of CDM/JI (Art. 6 and 12 in KP).</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for granting participation to all Kyoto Protocol (KP) signers from the Annex I group and all non-Annex I countries conditional on their reserves; 2 for granting participation on AI countries conditional on reserves and all non-Annex I countries with a JI/CDM DNA office; 3 all KP signers from Annex I group conditional on their reserves and eligible non-Annex I countries with a Designated National Authority that met the KP period 1 quota.</p>

Differentiated responsibilities	<p>Binary variable (0-1 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on whether to exclude or include the concept of "common but differentiated responsibilities" (see Art. 10 of KP).</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>0 for leaving the Convention text as it is, i.e. accounting for "common but differentiated responsibilities" [also, argument of "low per capita" emissions and inter-generational responsibility]; 1 for changing the Convention text to, e.g. common (equal) responsibilities.</p>
Eligibility REDD under Kyoto mechanisms	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on how much the land use sector could account for the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms (CDM) under Art. 12, and specifically whether developed countries may use carbon credits from reduced deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) as offsets, and hence, what the role of market funding would be.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for emphasizing the need to make emission reduction commitments that are additional to action on REDD (conditional group argument); 2 for making funding available through market mechanisms for flows of emission reductions, such as reduced deforestation, while public funding would support the maintenance of carbon stocks, for instance, through enhanced forest management (mixed argument); 3 for having both institutions and markets offer the means to provide financial incentives at the scale required for effective REDD action, as long as such funding is flanked by resources for capacity building and market readiness (free argument).</p>
Emission trade affiliation for 2nd period	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the creation of a trading scheme for emission credits. It estimates when and on what conditions a country would want to implement such trading scheme as encouraged by the Kyoto Protocol mechanism in art. 17.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for only discussing a trading scheme implementation / no trading registry as of before of 2012; 2 for supporting a scheme to take place as of 2012 and to receive credits; 3 for implementing a carbon emission trading scheme before 2012.</p>

<p>Intl Accountability and Responsibility</p>	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the level of international vs. domestic responsibility and accountability that the UNFCCC should qualify itself with. International accountability entails a reliance to international research and institutional monitoring, while the domestic accountability entails a nationally-oriented perception of responsibilities.</p> <p>Note: The signature of international environmental conventions including the Kyoto Protocol is irrelevant, as all countries submitting the reports have signed them. Do not code information on the signature, but do code information on ratification status.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for supporting international accountability at the condition of prioritizing national circumstances ('special conditions') and making international accountability secondary to national responsibility (stress on national sovereignty);</p> <p>2 for supporting international accountability and letting domestic institutions step aside, implement or fill the gaps (i.e. preference for moderate international accountability/ interest in a national role in the international setup, hence a comparability between the national and the international schemes) - this position is revealed by the use of words such as "endorsement";</p> <p>3 for proposing and supporting 'uber alles' international accountability (and therefore being subject to international law) without constraints - this position corresponds to countries that perceive only the instruments in defence of international interests (international inspections, a punishment mechanism), and is often denoted by words such as "international transparency" and "institutional implementation".</p>
<p>Int'l bunkers</p>	<p>Ordinal variables (1-4 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the records on emissions from international aviation and maritime transport (see Art. 2.2 of KP).</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for not calculating these emissions as part of the national GHG inventories, and not committing to discuss their totals; 2 for calculating them as part of the national GHG inventories, but excluding them from the national totals and limiting reduction commitment; 3 for calculating them as part of the national GHG inventories, and allowing for voluntary reduction commitments and inclusion in national totals; 4 for making their calculation and limitation mandatory.</p>

<p>Legally binding intl treaty</p>	<p>Ordinal variable (1-4 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the state of the Convention and the Kyoto Protocol in terms of binding international law (see Art. 20 of the KP on the rules of agreement and acceptance).</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for preferring no legally binding protocol in the present nor in the (short-term) future, wanting the Convention to be unbinding, even if ratified; 2 for wanting a binding protocol enforceable at conditions to be discussed in the future but keeping it unbinding for the short-term (this may entail reshuffling Annexes and making new binding commitments for the future); 3 for preferring a binding protocol enforceable in the future (e.g. a new agreement that may eventually become binding); 4 for claiming an enforced protocol right away in the present, where all bound according to the current rules.</p>
<p>Limit of warming (C degrees)</p>	<p>Ordinal variable (values 1-3)</p> <p>This issue underlies the scenarios that countries prefer to assess in view of their future action.</p> <p>1 for a position that takes 550 ppm CO₂e as reasonable (i.e. a sufficient limit to 3-5 degrees C of temperature rise); 2 for a position that wants to limit the atmospheric target to 400-550 ppm CO₂e (a limit to 2-3 degrees C of temperature rise); 3 for wanting less than 400 ppm CO₂e (a limit to less than 2 degrees C)</p>
<p>Technology transfer (patents)</p>	<p>Ordinal variables (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the introduction of technology transfers in the international assistance channels to developing countries (see Art. 2.3 of KP).</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for supporting the provision to developing countries of funds that secondarily/indirectly link to technological transfers (e.g. funds with first priority in poverty reduction or "sustainable development"); 2 for supporting the provision of structured funds that include among other goals the technological transfer *but* do not grant intellectual rights, OR proposing a gradual or conditioned introduction of technologies without transfer in the side line; 3 for supporting developing countries with funds that have a strict focus on technology transfer *and* grant intellectual rights (special focus, special facilitation).</p>

<p>Mitigation emphasis (projects) *** ratio with "Adaptation emphasis"***</p>	<p>Continuous variable (value of the costs of mitigation-orientated project)</p> <p>This variable captures the willingness to invest/receive money in forms of mitigation-relevant projects. For Annex I countries this entails internal investments and investments in developing countries, while for non-Annex I countries this entails internal investments and receipts from other countries or multilateral funds (it may include mitigation-specific GEF funds).</p> <p>Capacity building may be considered part of this category when it implies foreign investment in abatement lessons and technology transfers (e.g. application of new technologies and industry's energy efficiency), but also the development of communications and reports to the UNFCCC as well as money to strengthening information gathering. Mitigation projects include industrial technology upgrading, performing implementation tasks, introducing new energy extraction techniques, etc.</p> <p>Note 1: If the value of the cost of the project is in a different rate than the USD, register as such (it is converted later)</p> <p>Note 2: If the project is funded through an international-national partnership, count only the national part of the funding. If the project is funded by an international organization only, count the full cost as this money was assigned to the country. If the project is funded by a non-public international organization or the private sector only, do NOT count the costs.</p>
<p>ODA support (IO collaboration)</p>	<p>Binary variable (0-1 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the financial additionality of climate change funds, i.e. whether to link (or divert) international development assistance money (ODA/IDA) to climate change aid or whether to keep them separate (debate over Art. 11.2b of KP).</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>0 for not linking UNFCCC-specific funding for climate change directly to international assistance (i.e. keeping the funds destined for ODA separate to specific climate projects); 1 for linking (diverting but integrating) funds destined in ODA (no special selection).</p>
<p>LUCF recording</p>	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the baseline level of assurance from the reduction fro REDD-related activities - given the proposed additional activities/measures (inclusive of biomass regeneration, if included).</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for proposing using historical national deforestation rates as a benchmark; 2 for suggesting adjusting such historical deforestation benchmarks for each country by a factor reflecting the income level of the country, as well as its forest area, rewarding countries that have maintained high forest cover, and grant low-income countries additional funds to limit deforestation; 3 for projecting deforestation with a more complex model, since the reference emission level may need modification to reflect causal understanding of socio-economic factors that determine the rate of deforestation or forest degradation, rather than simply being set equal to the historical rate.</p>

Reduction of GHG (target)	<p>Continuous variable (percentage)</p> <p>This variable captures the commitment to reduce emissions in the future (~2020 onwards) compared to 2000 levels. This shows which countries agree to cap GHG emission at 2000 levels and which agree to reduce *below* the 1990 levels, and also which countries agree to reduce though they are not required and which refuse even if required.</p> <p>This is used to compare the decision of the aggregate global reduction target versus the preferred targets as conveyed by the Copenhagen (2009) quantified reduction pledges.</p>
Supplementarity	<p>Binary variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the option of linking use of the KP mechanism and other UNFCCC resources to the principle of supplementarity (Art. 7 of the KP).</p> <p>The values are:</p> <p>1 for allowing KP benefits not to be conditional nor additional on domestic action (non-Annex I countries shall not be bound to supplementarity and Annex I countries shall have no direct obligations); 2 for linking supplementarity to funding receipt, 3 for linking KP mechanisms with action by all Parties: an Annex I country shall meet a certain level of domestic action requirement, and a non-Annex I country shall assign itself the duty to work on climate change with its own domestic resources first, and then subsequently draw from the UNFCCC instruments.</p>
Systematic observation implementation	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the minimum level of measurement and verification preferred by each Party in climate change policy. This position must be proxied here with the status of measurement and how the country portrays present and future action to implement observations -- it is assumed that all countries submitting the national reports are interested in conducting some level of climate change observation (Art. 4 and 5 of the Convention). This issue does *not* capture positions on the vulnerability or the data for the Inventory.</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for favouring some reporting (or planning to report) but no systematic rules in place because of some challenge (e.g. disagreement with IPCC); "voluntary" monitoring/reporting;</p> <p>3 for reporting and accounting for carbon stocks in some form of scheme with some details but no holistic frame or no definitive monitoring schedule ["temporary"/short-term monitoring]; yes for planning to report more in depth in the future + retrieve more data;</p> <p>4 for reporting and accounting for carbon stock changes according to a strict system of rules ["permanent" monitoring].</p>

Voluntary vs stringent/obligatory measures	<p>Ordinal variable (1-3 values).</p> <p>This variable captures the position on the role that the national government should play towards firms and industries, and therefore the type of relation (and requirements) that the government should provide to the private sector (this issue is part of the discussion on Art. 5 of the KP on national reporting systems).</p> <p>Note 1: such 'requirements' go from imposing reporting duties and regulative action to formulating programmes and agreements in coordination with the private sector and firms (do NOT include industrial laws or acts)</p> <p>The possible values are:</p> <p>1 for pursuing voluntary/lenient/liberally supportive programmes [i.e. private sectors' loans and grants, end-consumer prices, industrial credits, voluntary certificates, tax credits, etc]; 2 for pursuing semi-voluntary programmes/partial tax/flexible tax requirements/joint action [i.e. labelling; agreements/moderate limitations/complementarity; demand-side management; gradual regulation; statement of mutual understanding; tax incentives]; 3 for pursuing stringent and unconditional requirements ["producer responsibility"; market discipline; bye-laws; regulatory subsidy; a top-down tax - unless noted otherwise, is "stringent and obligatory"].</p>
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